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This Article examines the relationship between procedure and
substance, and the way in which that relationship affects Erie
questions. It first suggests that "procedure" should be understood in
terms of process-in other words, in terms of the way that it changes
the substance of the law and the value of legal claims. It then argues
that the traditional view that the definitions of "procedure" and
"substance" change with the context-a pillar on which present Erie
analysis is based-is wrong. Finally, it suggests a single process-
based principle that reconciles all of the Supreme Court's
"procedural Erie" cases: that federal courts can apply their own
rules to process a claim as long as, in a costless and outcome-neutral
world, those rules do not affect the ex ante value of a claim at the
time of its filing.
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Using the Supreme Court's Shady Grove1 decision as its foil,
this Article examines the nature of procedure, procedure's relationship
to substance, and the Erie questions that arise when the procedural
rules that federal and state courts use to adjudicate state-law claims
vary. I conclude that the result in Shady Grove was correct-that a
federal court should adopt the federal class-action rule even though
New York's procedural code would have barred a New York state court
from proceeding with the same case on a class-wide basis. I come to
this result, however, not for the reasons offered either in Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion or in Justice Stevens' concurrence.
2
The Article's point of departure is the one matter on which
Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg, who authored
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Joe Bauer, A.J. Bellia, Kevin
Clermont, Thorn Main, Jim Pfander, Tom Rowe, Suzanna Sherry, and Patrick Woolley for
comments on drafts of this essay.
1. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
2. Justice Stevens joined parts of Justice Scalia's opinion, thus creating a majority for
some aspects of Shady Grove. On the exact points of agreement and departure between the
plurality and the concurrence, as well as their differences from the dissent, see infra notes 11-
13, 91, 97-100 and accompanying text.
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the dissent, agreed: procedural rules affect the outcomes of lawsuits.
3
The outcome-affecting consequences of procedural rules frame the
Erie/Rules Enabling Act problem with which courts have wrestled
since Erie. Erie itself commanded that federal courts apply state
substantive law, rather than "federal general common law," to claims
that lie within diversity jurisdiction. 4 The hard question, of which
Shady Grove is the most recent iteration, is the extent to which Erie's
penumbra-as well as the similar requirement of the Rules Enabling
Act that no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rule") "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right"5-commands the same result
with respect to procedural rules. For, even if a federal court applies
the same substantive law that a state court would apply, the outcome-
influencing potential of procedural rules means that a federal court
applying federal procedural rules to a state-law claim might arrive at
an outcome different from that of a state court applying the relevant
state's procedural rules to the same claim.
The Court has not walked a straight line in resolving this
problem; with nearly every case, the Court seems to correct course or
careen in a different direction.6 The Court has, however, settled on an
analytical structure, which was delineated in Hanna v. Plumer7 and
3. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) ("The test is not whether the
rule affects a litigant's substantive rights; most procedural rules do."); id. at 1455, 1459 n.18
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 1471-72 n.13 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Erie rule has also applied to state-
law claims brought into federal court by means of supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Wiltel Commc'ns Sys., 103 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Nevada law applied in a
defamation claim being heard under supplemental jurisdiction). For the sake of simplicity,
however, I refer to the application of the Erie doctrine only in diversity cases.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). Scholars have often noted a curious juxtaposition of events:
The Rules Enabling Act, originally enacted in 1934, see Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415,
48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2006)), resulted in the Supreme
Court's promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on December 20, 1937, see Order of
December 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (1937), about four months before Erie was decided. Justice
Brandeis, who authored Erie, was the only Justice who did "not approve of the adoption of the
Rules." 302 U.S. at 783.
6. For instance, the Court's last Rules Enabling Actl"procedural Erie" case before Shady
Grove was Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), in which Justice
Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion and Justice Scalia dissented-both stating views that they
essentially replicated in Shady Grove. The major cases before Gasperini reflect comparable zigs
and zags. The litany of the Rules Enabling Act/"procedural Erie" cases that first-year law
students can recite-Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965);
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); and Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991)-is enough to prove the point.
7. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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refined in John Hart Ely's exegesis of Hanna.8 This analysis cleaves
the choice-of-procedural-law question into two halves-a Rules
Enabling Act branch and a "procedural Erie" (or Rules of Decision Act)
branch. Under the first branch, federal courts can almost always apply
a Federal Rule that is promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act;9
under the second branch, a federal court must apply the relevant
state's procedural rule when no Federal Rule addresses the situation
and differences in federal and state procedural rules might induce
forum shopping or lead to "inequitable administration of the laws."'10
General agreement on this analytical structure has not
translated into agreement on results. As Shady Grove shows, the
initial "characterization question"-whether a case falls on the
Enabling Act or the Erie side of the line-can lack a clear answer.1
8. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1974).
9. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (stating that a federal court can refuse to apply a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure only when "the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in
their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions").
10. Id. at 468, 470.
11. In the Rules Enabling Act/"procedural Erie" context, the critical first question is
whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the
Court." Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50. When there is a "direct collision" between a Federal Rule
and a state rule, then the Rules Enabling Act analysis comes into play; but if there is no conflict,
then the "procedural Erie" analysis comes into play. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-72. Once that
issue is resolved, then there is the second-level characterization question: in Enabling Act cases,
whether the Federal Rule is a rule of "procedure," see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-44 (2010); and in "procedural Erie" cases, whether the
federal rule "would invite forum-shopping and yield markedly disparate litigation outcomes," see
id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Characterization problems are common in choice-of-law analysis. One of the most difficult
characterization issues in horizontal (i.e., state-to-state) choice-of-law analysis is whether an
issue is "substantive" or "procedural." If it is substantive, then constitutional and doctrinal rules
constrain a forum court's ability to choose its own law. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 799 (1985) (discussing full-faith-and-credit and due process constraints); Friedrich K
Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 109--17 (1989)
(discussing various choice-of-law methodologies that might lead a forum court to choose another
jurisdiction's substantive law). On the other hand, forum courts are generally free as a
constitutional matter to choose their own procedural rules to resolve a dispute. See Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) ("Since the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters
on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural
rules to actions litigated in its courts."); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 406 (1930) (stating
in dicta that "matters which relate only to the remedy are unquestionably governed by the lex
fori"). As a choice-of-law matter, they usually do so. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 122 (1971); but see id. §§ 125, 133-34 (describing circumstances in which a forum court
might use non-forum procedural law). Because a court's ability to choose the law it wishes can
therefore hinge on its characterization of the rule as either "substantive" or "procedural," courts
have sometimes been accused of manipulating the characterization issue to get the law they
desire. See id. § 122 cmt. b (noting courts' tendency to follow precedent when characterizing an
issue as substantive or procedural without taking full account of the reasons why earlier cases
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Justice Scalia's opinion characterized the case as a Rules Enabling Act
matter,1 2 while Justice Ginsburg's dissent characterized the case as an
Erie matter. 1
3
Hanna's analysis has also found detractors. Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Hanna eloquently rejects Hanna's bifurcated approach,
arguing that Enabling Act and "procedural Erie" issues have a
common core and a common solution.14 In Shady Grove, Justice
Stevens, who supplied the critical fifth vote to reverse, similarly
reflected dissatisfaction with the Enabling Act half of the Hanna
analysis in his concurrence, and sought a middle ground that bridged
the chasm between the Enabling Act and "procedural Erie" branches.
15
It is far too early to sing a requiem for Hanna. But Shady
Grove exposes the ease of manipulating Hanna's framework, 16 the
contested nature of the framework itself, and the Court's ever veering
course in applying the framework in real-world contexts. In other
words, Shady Grove's fractured opinions suggest the need to
reconsider the problem from the ground up.
This Article posits a principle that explains the results in the
Court's seemingly meandering Enabling Act and "procedural Erie"
cases. In brief, if we assume a world in which processing a state-law
claim from filing through settlement or judgment is costless and
outcome-neutral, the claim has an expected value at the time of its
hypothetical filing in a state court. This value is a product of the
probability of recovery and the amount of the remedy if liability is
characterized an issue as such); id. § 122 cmt. c (noting the constitutional constraints on
characterizing a "substantive" issue as "procedural").
12. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437-42. Because Justice Stevens joined this portion of
Justice Scalia's opinion, there is majority support for this proposition. Id. at 1448.
13. Id. at 1465-69.
14. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474-78 (Harlan, J., concurring). According to Justice Harlan:
[T]he proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal
rule, whether "substantive" or "procedural," is to stay close to basic principles by
inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.
If so, Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule prevail, even in the face of a
conflicting federal rule.
Id. at 475 (footnote omitted).
15. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment) (stating that the Enabling Act analysis requires a federal court to consider whether a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is "sufficiently intertwined with a state right or remedy" that it
affects substantive rights).
16. The manipulability of Hanna's two-branch analysis was also noted in Abram Chayes,
The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 751 (1974) (responding critically to Ely, supra note 8).
Professor Ely responded to Professor Chayes in John Hart Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV.
753, 753 (1974).
[Vol. 64:3:877880
PROCEDURE, SUBSTANCE, AND ERIE
found.17 What a federal court cannot do-whether its choice involves a
Federal Rule or a common-law procedural rule 8 -is to choose a rule
that affects this expected value. What a federal court can do is to
choose its own rules to transmute the claim from this expected value
to its actual value-even when those rules differ from the rules that a
state court would use to process the claim, and even when those rules
result in a recovery different from the recovery that the plaintiff(s)
would have enjoyed in state court.
Part I begins by eschewing the rights-based or efficiency-based
arguments that dominate modern discussions about procedure.
Instead, it examines what legal process does as a functional matter: it
turns a thing of uncertain value (a legal claim) into a thing of certain
value (a settlement or judgment). In the course of rendering the
uncertain into the certain, rules of procedure inevitably change the
value of substantive entitlements and claims-a fact that drives the
need to separate those state-created rules that federal courts must
adopt from those that they need not adopt.
Part II then examines the range of tests that might be, or have
been, used to determine when federal courts must apply a state-
created rule in the Erie context. It shows that the tests the Court itself
has used to address parts of this issue focus insufficiently on-and are
sometimes willfully blind to-the consequences that rules of legal
process have for the outcomes of lawsuits. The Court's handling of
Enabling Act/"procedural Erie" issues has been unstable because it
has been unwilling to decide head-on which consequences a federal
court must replicate and which it can ignore.
Although there is no correct answer to this question, Part III
assumes that both Erie and the Rules Enabling Act/"procedural Erie"
cases that have flowed from Erie are "right" in the sense that they
remain good law and reflect the Court's present view about the proper
allocation of rulemaking authority between the state and federal
systems. It then asks whether any single principle explains the
circumstances in which a federal court must replicate, insofar as legal
17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.4, at 598 (7th ed. 2007) ("The
plaintiffs net expected gain from litigating is the judgment if he wins discounted by his estimate
of the probability that he will win, minus his litigation costs."); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement,
and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11
J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 57 (1982) (discussing how risk-neutral parties make valuations based on
expected value, "discounting possible outcomes by their probabilities"). In Hand Formula terms,
the expected value of a claim is the P x L half of the P x L < B equation for determining
negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting out
Judge Hand's classic negligence formula).
18. I use the phrase "common-law procedural rule" to refer to the rule that a federal court
would apply to a comparable non-diversity claim when no Federal Rule addresses the situation.
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rules can do so, a state court's outcome by applying the same rules
that a state court would use, and the circumstances in which a federal
court is free to ignore that outcome and apply its own rules to decide a
state-law claim. Part III shows that the principle described above
reconciles all the cases. It further argues that this principle can be
justified normatively.
I. PROCEDURE AND CHANGE
For centuries the Anglo-American tradition thoroughly
integrated and interwove rules of "procedure" (understood to be the
rules by which courts or other adjudicatory bodies 19 resolve legal
disputes) and rules of "substance" (understood to be the rules to which
citizens were supposed to conform their conduct outside of the
courtroom). As Sir Henry Maine aptly stated, "[s]o great is the
ascendency of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice,
that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted
in the interstices of procedure .... ,,20 Eventually the concepts of
"procedure" and "substance" split apart.21 By the nineteenth century,
as Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in The Common Law, "the
ancient forms of action ha[d] disappeared," allowing "the substantive
law [to be] approached [without regard to] the categories of the forms
of action."22 By the twentieth century, procedure fell to a subservient
role in legal thought, sometimes being described as "the handmaid of
justice" or as "adjective law."
23
19. For simplicity, I refer only to courts and courtroom procedure in the remainder of this
article. But the argument is not so limited, and extends to other adjudicatory bodies (such as
administrative agencies) and the procedures that they use to resolve disputes.
20. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (London, John
Murray 1883); see also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 59 (2d
ed. 1981) ("There was no substantive law to which pleading was adjective. These were the terms
in which the law existed and in which lawyers thought.").
21. Some scholars date the rise of the distinction between procedure and substance to the
late eighteenth century, tracing the dichotomy to Jeremy Bentham's 1782 work Of Laws in
General. E.g., Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 801, 804-05 (2010); D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REV.
189, 191 (1982).
22. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 53-54 (A.B.A. Publ'g 2009) (1881);
id. at 1 (noting the distinction between "the substance of the law" and "its form and machinery").
23. See In re Coles, [1907] i KB. 1 at 4 (Eng.) (stating that "the relation of rules of practice
to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress"); Charles E.
Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938) (quoting In re Coles, but
pointing out that confining rules of procedure to "handmaid" status is difficult in practice);
Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 617 (1908) (claiming that
lawyers "lose sight of the end of procedure, they make scientific procedure an end of itself, and
882
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Today procedure is conceived of as a set of doctrines (pleading,
joinder, jurisdiction, and the like) used during adjudication, rather
than a concept that permeates all aspects of law. Procedural
scholarship conceives of procedure as a distinct field of inquiry, akin to
substantive fields, that is responsive to policies and arguments that
are either consequentialist (i.e., as a means of enforcing substantive
rights with as little friction as possible), deontological (i.e., as a means
of ensuring that individuals' rights in fair process are respected), or
both.
24
I begin by considering legal process not in historical terms nor
in terms of first principles, but in terms of what it does.
A. Procedure as Process
In thinking functionally about legal process, the word "process"
is itself significant. "Process" implies change or evolution from one
state to another; a process "passes on to the future a construction
made from the materials of the past. '25 In particular, substantive legal
entitlements are in the process of changing from what they were in
the past to what they will be in the future. In an individual lawsuit, a
legal claim evolves as well. When a party brings a claim of entitlement
into the legal system, the claim is, to use an old-fashioned term,
"inchoate."26 When it leaves the legal system, it is "choate"-it has
been changed from something of uncertain value to something given a
definite value by a judgment, settlement, or voluntary dismissal. 27 In
other words, when the claim is introduced into the system, it has an
expected value;28 when it leaves the system, it has an actual value.
thus, in the result, make adjective law an agency for defeating or delaying substantive law and
justice instead of one for enforcing and speeding them").
24. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 919, 933, 939 (1999) (discussing principles
under which procedural rulemaking should be done). The word "friction" is something of a dodge,
for there are two distinct camps for those who see law in instrumental terms. One is a rights-
based camp, which believes that procedural rules should enforce the underlying substantive legal
rights as strongly as possible; the other is an efficiency-based camp, which believes that
procedural rules should enforce substantive legal rights at the lowest social cost possible. Id. at
919, 933. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 228
(2004) (discussing philosophical and economic understandings of procedure).
25. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PROCESS PHILOSOPHY: A SURVEY OF BASIC ISSUES 22 (2000). In the
quoted passage, Professor Rescher was speaking specifically of natural processes, but other
processes act in the same way.
26. A legal right is "inchoate" when it "has not fully developed, matured, or vested."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 830 (9th ed. 2009).
27. A "choate" claim is "[c]omplete in and of itself," or a claim "[hiaving ripened or become
perfected." Id. at 275.
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, when a case commences, a legal entitlement has a certain
strength; when the lawsuit ends, that entitlement has changed-
either by being made stronger through its reaffirmation on the facts
the case presents, or being made weaker by its undermining or
modification in light of these facts. Between the lawsuit's filing and its
end, the value of the claim and the strength of the entitlement are
constantly changing as new information flows into the case.29
When a plaintiff files a claim, a myriad of possible processes
might lead the court, the lawyers, and the parties to assign the claim
its final value (using a dart board, a Ouija board, a coin flip, etc.). But
courts, lawyers, and parties use a limited number of processes to
resolve legal claims; in the U.S. system, the process is usually
composed of one or more subprocesses, such as pleading, discovery,
dispositive motions, trial, and appeal. By choosing one particular
process over others, the resolution of claims is channeled away from
outcomes that might have been imaginable under some processes and
channeled toward other outcomes. 30
In this functional view, rules of procedure are not themselves
the process that evaluates entitlements and values the claims that
implicate them; the process is the set of actions (filing and answering
the complaint, taking depositions, writing motions) that move the case
from its beginning to its end. Rules of procedure represent the process
of evaluating entitlements and valuing the claims that implicate
them, in the same way that a script represents the process of
performing a play or a score of music represents the process of playing
a song.3
1
To be sure, the procedures that the court, the lawyers, and the
parties follow do not by themselves determine a claim's value or its
fluctuations in value over the course of the litigation. Some of the
factors that establish this value precede the submission of the claim
for adjudication; particularly important are the strength of the
entitlement that was allegedly violated (that is, the "substantive
law"), 32 as well as the quality and quantity of the evidence that is
available to prove the entitlement and even the expectations of the
29. For an excellent demonstration of this idea from a real-options analysis, see Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2006).
30. See RESCHER, supra note 25, at 22 ("Each such process envisions some sector of the
future and canalizes it into regions of possibility more restrained in range than would otherwise,
in theory, be available.").
31. Id. at 24-25.
32. This effect of an entitlement on a claim's value can be strong if the entitlement is a well-
accepted principle, or it can be weaker if the claim is novel, requires an extension of an existing
entitlement, or requires a reversal of an existing entitlement.
[Vol. 64:3:877
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process that is likely to be used to resolve the claim. Other factors that
establish the claim's value develop between the time of the claim's
submission for adjudication and its denouement. Aside from the
process that is used to transmute the claim into something of fixed
value, these factors include the quality of legal representation, 33 the
ways in which the evidence unfolds (for example, the seemingly
unflappable witness who blurts out a devastating concession, or the
smoking-gun document that unexpectedly emerges from the bottom of
a file cabinet), the parties' financial capacity to litigate, and their risk
preferences for avoiding the publicity, burdens, or result of a trial.
B. How Process Changes Entitlements and Values
Even though the process that guides a claim from an inchoate
to a choate state is only one influence-and in most cases not the
principal influence-in establishing the strength of an entitlement or
the value of a claim, it is hardly insignificant. Procedure invariably
changes entitlements and the values of the claims that implicate them
for one (or more) of four reasons. The first reason is the costliness of
procedure. The cost of processing a claim affects the initial decision to
sue by affecting the expected value of a claim at the commencement of
litigation;34 and as a case proceeds through litigation, the prospect of
incurring further costs to process the claim affects both the parties'
decision whether to settle or continue to trial and the amount of any
settlement. 35 Moreover, the sunk costs that a party has already
incurred in processing a claim affect the value of the claim for the
parties moving forward from that point. 36  In addition, some
procedures allow the parties to achieve economies of scale; others do
not.37 And, in their decisions to use or forgo certain available
33. I assume that the parties are represented by lawyers, but the lack of such
representation for one or both sides also has an evident effect on the outcome.
34. The expected value of a claim is determined by multiplying the probability of recovery
by the expected recovery and then subtracting the costs of the process. Shavell, supra note 17, at
56. Two types of costs are associated with procedure: the direct cost of litigating the claim
(attorneys' fees, expert-witness fees, filing fees, and so on) and the cost of erroneous decisions.
POSNER, supra note 17, § 21.1-2, .10.
35. Id. § 21.4.
36. For one discussion of how sunk costs can affect the value of a claim, see Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J.
73, 113-14 (1990) (arguing that sunk costs may deter settlement after unsuccessful summary
judgment motions).
37. Classic examples of rules designed to achieve economies of scale are the rules of claim
joinder, party joinder, and consolidation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18-24, 42(a). Such rules do not
inevitably yield economies of scale; they can so complicate a case that they impose greater costs
than their savings, or can lead to unfair results. See, e.g., Malcolm v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d
2011]
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procedures, courts, lawyers, and parties must constantly balance the
procedures' enhancement of accuracy against their cost.38 However
this balance is struck under a given procedural system or in a given
case, the cost of the chosen procedures affects the value of a claim
decided under those rules.
Second, the process chosen to resolve claims affects
entitlements and a claim's value by altering the probability of recovery
on a claim. For instance, a process that permits broad discovery allows
a party with limited knowledge to access evidence within an
opponent's possession. 39 If the evidence damages the opponent, the
probability of prevailing goes up; if it supports the opponent, the
probability of prevailing declines. 40 A procedural system without broad
discovery yields a different probability of recovery, and therefore a
different value for a claim and a less fertile set of facts out of which to
craft legal entitlements. Likewise, a system with motions to dismiss
41
and defendants' motions for summary judgment 42  can provide
information on the probability of recovery, reducing the probability to
zero if the motion is successful but enhancing the probability of
recovery once the motion is hurdled. 43 A system of liberal party joinder
can enhance the possibility of a plaintiffs verdict;44 while a system
346, 354 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing a jury award in the trial of forty-eight consolidated cases
because the confluence of parties and variables led to jury confusion). In some systems, such as
the common-law system, joinder rules were severely restricted, making such economies almost
impossible to realize. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.2 (5th ed. 2001). Of
course, in one sense, this was precisely what was at stake in Shady Grove: whether the plaintiffs
could use Rule 23 to achieve the economies of scale from bringing 10,000 similar claims in one
lawsuit. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1459 n.18
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
38. See POSNER, supra note 17, § 21.1 (noting that the economic objective of a procedural
system is to minimize the sum of the cost of an erroneous judgment and the cost of operating the
system).
39. For the broad discovery rules used in federal court, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37, 45.
40. See POSNER, supra note 17, § 21.5, at 602 (noting that pretrial discovery can increase
the likelihood of settlement if a defendant learns that the plaintiff's case is stronger than the
defendant originally estimated). For information regarding the way in which the possibility of
discovering damaging information can induce a plaintiff to invest in a lawsuit with a negative
expected value, see Grundfest & Huang, supra note 29, at 1277 (using option theory to explain
that a lawsuit with a negative expected value is equivalent to an out-of-the-money call option
that a plaintiff will rationally pursue so as long as the price of the option is low enough and its
volatility is high enough).
41. For the available motions to dismiss in federal court, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)-(7).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
43. For an analysis demonstrating that a denial of a defendant's motion for summary
judgment can decrease the plaintiffs willingness to settle, see Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra
note 36, at 102-03.
44. See, e.g., Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The
Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive
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that bifurcates liability from remedy can enhance the probability of a
defense verdict. 45 More generally, the accuracy-enhancing or accuracy-
distorting use to which every rule of procedure is put in a given case
affects the probability of recovery.
46
Third, procedure affects the nature and structure of legal
entitlements (that is, the substantive law) directly. To explain, let me
provide three examples drawn from the "procedural" law of joinder.
First, rules of preclusion, which are usually said to be substantive,
47
have expanded in scope as a result of expansion in the joinder rules.
48
Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 916-17 (2000) [hereinafter Horowitz &
Bordens, Consolidation] (reporting experimental data showing that the likelihood of plaintiffs'
recovery increases as more plaintiffs are joined); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The
Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated
Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 225-26 (1988) [hereinafter Horowitz &
Bordens, Aggregation] (reporting experimental data showing that aggregation of weak claims
increases the probability of recovery).
45. See, e.g., Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical
Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1617 (1963) (reporting statistics showing that defense verdicts
increase when the issue of liability is bifurcated and tried before damages).
46. The distortions in accuracy created by some procedural rules (for instance, rules that
make privileged from discovery certain relevant information) can be analyzed as an error cost,
see POSNER, supra note 17, § 21.1 (explaining the costs of an erroneous judgment), or as a factor
affecting the probability of recovery, see Shavell, supra note 17, at 56 (noting that the expected
value of a claim is the product of the likelihood of obtaining recovery and the amount of
recovery). Wherever it is accounted for, the point is the same: the accuracy-enhancing or
accuracy-distorting effect of procedural rules affects a claim's value. For instance, in one sense,
Shady Grove was a debate about whether Rule 23 enhanced the accuracy of the result by making
a meritorious but independently unviable claim economically feasible, see Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1458-59 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (implying the need to permit class action litigation when
an aggrieved party did not have the economic incentive to pursue a claim), or whether it
distorted the accurate outcome of a nearly, or perhaps entirely, valueless claim, see id. at 1460
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the use of Rule 23 "transform[s] a $500 case into a
$5,000,000 award"); id. at 1465 n.3 ("A court's decision to certify a class accordingly places
pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims.").
47. See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001) (noting
that if Rule 41 mandated a claim-preclusive effect for claims arising under state law, then Rule
41 "would arguably violate ... the Rules Enabling Act" by modifying a substantive right). The
drafters of the original Federal Rules regarded preclusion rules as substantive, and therefore
beyond the terms of the Rules Enabling Act's delegation of rulemaking power. See Stephen B.
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 634 & n.49 (1985) (noting the drafters deleted from an amendment to
Rule 14 a sentence regarding preclusive effects of judgment because it would have been
substantive); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1164 n.637 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act] (noting multiple instances in
which the Advisory Committee acknowledged that preclusive effects of judgment are
substantive).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS intro., at 6 (1982) (noting the
"complementary relationship between the law of procedure and the law of res judicata"); id. at 6-
10 (describing how the expansion of joinder from common-law pleading to the Federal Rules
changed the scope of claim and issue preclusion).
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Second, legislation that adopts several liability-an even more clearly
substantive rule-typically reduces the plaintiffs damages by the
percentage of fault attributable to nonparties. 49 Such a rule is fair
principally because modern joinder rules permit the addition of all
potential tortfeasors in one case;50 if a plaintiff chooses not to effect
the joinder of a tortfeasor, the argument goes, it is not unfair for the
plaintiff, rather than the other tortfeasors, to bear that portion of the
loss. Finally, the doctrine of market-share liability is fair principally
because (and is imaginable only in a world in which) most plaintiffs
and most defendants can be joined in a single suit.51 My point here is
not to argue that expansive preclusion, several liability, or market-
share liability are correct as a matter of law or policy. 52 Rather, it is to
point out that substantive law-and important changes to that law-
emerge against a procedural backdrop that is often taken for granted,
but without which the substantive law could not work as intended and
would not be structured as it is.
Procedure's shaping of substance extends beyond providing this
backdrop. For instance, the interplay between substance and
procedure shows up in the legislative arena. The shape of substantive
legislation vitally depends on the process through which the
legislation is enacted (unicameral versus bicameral, majority versus
49. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(A)-(B) (2003) (detailing Arizona's liability
apportionment scheme, which allocates damages based on percentage of fault); Jonathan Cardi,
Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on Comparative
Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1997)
(noting that the "majority of states with a pure or modified form of several liability that have
addressed the issue allow evidence of nonparty fault generally to be introduced into the
distribution calculus"); id. at 1305 n.72 (listing the statutes and cases supporting this assertion).
50. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (permitting joinder of defendants if any right to relief,
including tort relief, is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative).
51. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (providing for multi-district transfer); FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(1), 20(a)(2), 23 (detailing rules for permissive joinder of plaintiffs, permissive joinder of
defendants, and class actions). For instance, the first case to adopt market-share liability,
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980), involved a class of plaintiffs injured
by DES joining as defendants about ninety percent of the going concerns that had manufactured
DES. When virtually every plaintiff and every defendant is brought into the case, and when the
product sold is fungible (i.e., posing identical risk), then the idea of dividing liability according to
market share is arguably justified. Even those cases that departed from Sindell and permitted a
single plaintiff to sue a single DES manufacturer used as one of the rationales the ability of the
sued manufacturer to use the procedural device of impleader to add additional manufacturers.
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 51 (Wis. 1984). For the federal impleader rule, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 14.
52. Compare Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 551 (Wis. 2005)
(extending "risk contribution theory," similar to market share liability, to claims against lead-
paint manufacturers), with Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. 1997)
(rejecting market share liability for lead-paint manufacturers), and State v. Henley, 787 N.W.2d
350, 368 n.29 (Wis. 2010) (noting in dicta Gramling's possible unconstitutionality).
PROCEDURE, SUBSTANCE, AND ERIE
supermajority, veto versus no veto).53 Nor has the role of procedure in
defining substantive entitlements escaped the attention of Congress,
which sometimes blunts substantive liability by imposing procedural
hurdles. Recent examples are the toughened pleading and class-action
requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA") 54 and the heightened pleading requirements of the Y2K
Act.55 Although the lack of widespread computer failures rendered the
Y2K Act unnecessary in hindsight, the PSLRA has (whether for good
or ill) reduced the amount of securities-fraud litigation, and thus the
liability of sellers of securities. 56 And Congress accomplished this goal
without changing a single word of substantive securities law.
57
Fourth, the chosen procedures help to shape the value of
substantive claims by affecting the amount of the recovery. A system
that allows broad discovery might lead to the uncovering of
information that allows a litigant to pursue a new theory of recovery
or defense, or might permit a party to seek recovery of a form of
damages (perhaps punitive damages) unimagined at the time that the
litigation commenced. When joined with a liberal system of amending
the initial pleadings, such a procedural approach can change the ex
ante expectation of the proper amount of recovery; conversely, a
system without broad discovery or a policy of liberal amendment will
likely lead to a different level of recovery.58 A system in which
53. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2001) (describing how "federal lawmaking procedures" such as bicameralism
and supermajority voting advance constitutional concerns for the separation of powers and
federalism).
54. Private Litigation Securities Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)).
55. Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17
(2006)).
56. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 622 (2007) (demonstrating empirically that the PSLRA
has had "important negative impacts on nonnuisance litigation," especially in small-value cases).
57. In the well-known words of Rep. John D. Dingell:
Most people look at the procedure as being something that's just kind of amorphous
and you don't have to worry much about it. The procedure is of exquisite
importance.... I'll let you write the substance on a statute and you let me write the
procedure, and I'll screw you every time.
Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the H. Subcomm. on Admin. Law &
Governmental Relations, 98th Cong. 312 (1983).
58. Systems of procedure can have different views on the liberality of amendment. As a
general matter, the modern American view is to permit liberal amendment. See FED. R. CIv. P.
15(a)(2) (permitting amendments "when justice so requires"). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A),
(4) (requiring "good cause" to permit an amendment after the deadline for amendments has
passed). Common-law pleading, on the other hand, did not permit amendments that shifted the
legal theory the plaintiff was pursuing. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.4 ('CThe inquiry was
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plaintiffs have a liberal opportunity to join together or otherwise
consolidate their claims similarly can affect the value of each
individual plaintiffs claim.59
Although in theory two different systems of procedure might
result in the same outcome for a given claim,60 the procedures that
resolve legal claims are generally not fungible: courts, lawyers, and
parties that apply different sets of procedures will affect the value of a
claim in different ways. A process that provides no opportunities for
depositions or limited opportunities for the discovery of documents
(and thus no opportunity to fix a witness's testimony before trial or
find the incriminating document in the file cabinet) likely guides a
claim toward an outcome different from the one achieved in a system
with liberal discovery. A process that imposes heavy costs on one or all
parties, or that induces the decisionmaker to render predictably
different judgments in comparison to the judgments that would be
rendered under other processes, also affects the outcome.61 A process
in which discovery precedes pleading will not invariably lead to the
same outcome as a process in which pleading precedes discovery.
62
Indeed, if the processes by which courts established the value of a
claim were fungible and transitive, then the debate in a case such as
Shady Grove-whether to use the class-action process or not-would
not whether plaintiff should recover under the law of the land, but whether plaintiff had proved
a case ... in whatever form the action had been brought.").
59. See, e.g., Horowitz & Bordens, Consolidation, supra note 44, at 916 (reporting
experimental data showing that the average award decreases when more than four plaintiffs are
joined); Horowitz & Bordens, Aggregation, supra note 44, at 226 (reporting experimental data
showing that aggregation of weak claims with strong claims can suppress the value of strong
claims).
60. See RESCHER, supra note 25, at 19 (noting that the sameness of the outcome does not
define the process).
61. For literature either modeling or experimentally demonstrating the effects of different
procedural devices on the outcomes of cases, see, for example, Horowitz & Bordens,
Consolidation, supra note 44, at 909 (describing experimental results in which different joinder
patterns affected case outcomes); Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 36, at 123 (modeling
summary judgment outcomes based on mathematical analysis); Zeisel & Callahan, supra note
45, at 1607-08 (analyzing outcomes in actual unitary and bifurcated trials).
62. Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (establishing a pleading
standard designed "to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery"), with id. at 586
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "fear of the burdens of litigation does not justify factual
conclusions supported only by lawyers' arguments rather than sworn denials or admissible
evidence"). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940-41 (2009) (affirming the general
applicability of Twombly's approach in federal cases); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly,
Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 503-05 (2010) (arguing that federal judges should
typically permit some discovery before ruling on a motion to dismiss a claim); Rebecca Love
Kourlis, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 274-77 (2010) (discussing states in
which pre-suit discovery ameliorates heightened-pleading requirements).
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be an academic one, of no practical consequence, and hardly worth
litigating all the way to the Supreme Court.
63
Thus, a legal claim is like an untethered buoy bobbing in an
ocean. Its value constantly fluctuates up and down as a result of
numerous influences-including the procedures that the court and
parties use to resolve the claim-until it comes to rest at its final
value (as defined by a settlement, judgment, or voluntary dismissal).
This process of changing and ultimately establishing and valuing the
parties' substantive entitlements has ripple effects that extend into
the future, as the rejection or reaffirmation of a particular legal
entitlement, as well as the establishment of a definite value for that
entitlement, helps to create the expected value for similar subsequent
claims.
C. The Inevitability of Change
But, one might object, even if the use of some or many rules of
procedure affects substantive entitlements or a claim's value, that fact
does not prove that all rules of procedure intrinsically shape
substantive entitlements or affect the value of substantive claims.
Take, for instance, the most quintessentially procedural of all rules-
the requirement that pleadings and motions be filed on 8%" x 11"
paper.64 Surely this rule is too trivial to act as a force that changes the
substance of the parties' entitlements or the values of their claims.
But I do indeed claim that the use of every "procedural" rule
changes entitlements and values of claims, and the "file on 8/2" x 11"
paper" rule provides an excellent vehicle for clarifying the nature of
the claim. Imagine the following procedural rule: every court filing
must be placed on special 8/" x 16" paper with gold-gilt edges. Such
paper costs, perhaps, $5 per page. 65 It is not difficult to see the effect
63. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985) (noting in a horizontal
choice-of-law context that "[tihere can be no [constitutional] injury in applying [the law of one
state] if it is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction connected with this suit").
64. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. Civ. R. 3-4(c)(1) (delineating the paper size requirements for filing
with the court).
65. This hypothetical is hardly fanciful. In English equity practice, masters made
significant fees by charging the parties exorbitant prices for the copies of legal documents that
they were required to have. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 426-27,
441-42 (1922) (detailing how court officials behaved opportunistically in generating revenues
from myriad procedural fees). The quality of justice suffered as a result. See id. at 442 (noting "a
consensus of evidence throughout the eighteenth century that it was better to sacrifice just
claims rather than embark upon a suit in equity'). Likewise, the Stamp Act of 1765, whose
passage was one of the events precipitating the American Revolution, mandated a tax on the
paper used for most filings in court. See Stamp Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.) (requiring a tax of
"one shilling and six pence" on "every Skin or Piece of Vellum or Parchment, or Sheet or Piece of
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that such a rule would have on the substantive law. It would
discourage the filing of claims other than those brought by the
wealthy, and it would be a means by which wealthy plaintiffs could
impose their will on less well-off defendants. The types of claims that
the wealthy would bring would likely skew the substantive law away
from "person in the street" sensibilities; for instance, if only well-to-do
parties can sue or be sued, a court is less likely to develop a robust
doctrine of unconscionability or other rules for consumer protection.
It is true that, in choosing between an 8%" x 11" rule rather
than an 8 " x 14" rule, the outcome-affecting consequences are very
slight. The same can be said of many other procedural choices. 66 But
that fact does not defeat the argument. First, to appreciate the effect
of procedural rules on substantive entitlements, it is sometimes
necessary to abstract from the fine-grain detail of a rule. Choosing
between 8 " x 11" and 8Y" x 14" paper for filings has virtually no
effect on a claim's value, but choosing between the use of widely
available paper and the use of paper that would be too costly for
ordinary litigants to obtain has an important effect. Second, even
though procedural rules invariably affect the value of substantive
claims, the degree of the change that different rules effect varies
among rules. Given that different rules impose different costs and
affect the probability or amount of recovery in different ways, some
rules have only a modest effect on the value of a claim or the shape of
a substantive entitlement; others have a great effect. A filing rule has
some effect on the value of a claim; however negligible, the effect is
greater than zero. Therefore, unless a rule of procedure is completely
inefficacious but absolutely costless-a combination unlikely to exist
in the real world-every rule used in adjudication affects the value of
the claim on which it operates and also exercises a prospective effect
on the expected values of future claims.
Paper, on which shall be ingrossed, written, or printed, any Petition, Bill, Answer, Claim, Plea,
Replication, Rejoinder, Demurrer, or other Pleading in any Court of Chancery or Equity," as well
as taxes ranging from three pence to ten shillings for papers used for other court filings),
repealed by 6 Geo. 3, c. 11 (1766).
66. Compare Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575, 1576 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that even "a state rule limiting the length of the complaint, for example, or specifying the
color and size of the paper" can affect the outcome when the federal rule is different), with
Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J.) (noting that federal courts
should not be required to follow "trivial state court rules" even when a statute generally requires
a federal court to apply state rules).
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D. Theoretical Commitments Behind "Procedure as the
Agency of Change"
Seeing legal procedure as the method guiding lawyers, parties,
and the court as inchoate claims are channeled into claims of certain
value might seem a generic, unobjectionable, and even banal
description. But the idea of "procedure as change" is quite radical, for
it makes substantive law impossible to understand apart from the
procedure that defines it and that constantly adjusts its value. Its
radical nature can be shown by means of an age-old philosophical
debate. The notion that change is a fundamental aspect of existence-
equal to or more fundamental than the substance on which it works-
dates to Heraclitus. 67 Reduced to its simplest expression, Heraclitus's
view was that "all things flow." 68 Perhaps the most vivid-and
certainly the most quoted-statement of his position is that "you
cannot go into the same water twice."69 The scope of Heraclitus's
commitment to change is debatable, 70 but Plato and Aristotle read him
for all he might be worth. Plato grudgingly adopted his view that
change was an invariable condition of the sensible world; he therefore
posited the existence of Forms, or unchanging ideals of which real
objects were but imperfect instantiations, to create the permanence
necessary for philosophical reflection. 71 Aristotle went further, holding
that Heraclitus's theory of flux was internally self-contradictory and
67. For an analysis of Heraclitus's thought, see Daniel W. Graham, Heraclitus, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2008), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus. Heraclitus's principal work is the cryptic and
mystical On Nature (ca. 500 B.C.E.), which survives only through fragmentary epigrams quoted
in the works of later philosophers. Id. § 1.
68. This description of Heraclitus's position belongs to Socrates. See PLATO, Cratylus, in
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF PLATO 421, 438 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds.,
Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961) (describing Socrates' analysis of Heraclitus's position that all
things are in motion and nothing is at rest); see also id. at 474 (describing Heraclitus's view that
"everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding").
69. This is the version that Plato gives in Cratylus. See id. at 439 (stating that "you cannot
go into the same water twice"). Other variants also exist. The variant that seems truest to
Heraclitus's syntax and structure is "on those stepping into rivers staying the same other and
other waters flow." See Graham, supra note 67, § 3.1 (discussing the different variations of
Heraclitus's views found in ancient works).
70. On a narrow reading, Heraclitus appears to argue that, because things are ever
changing, they are never knowable (or at least are knowable only by the few in possession of
logos)-a profoundly skeptical position. On a broader reading, he links change and continuity-
that only by constant change is permanence of matter possible. See Graham, supra note 67, §§
3.1, 5 ("It is that some things stay the same by changing.").
71. Plato developed aspects of his Theory of Forms in a number of works, including The
Republic. See Hugh Lawson-Tancred, Introduction, in ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS xi, xviii (Hugh
Lawson-Tancred trans., Penguin Books 1998).
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arguing that being, rather than becoming, was the defining
characteristic of existence.
72
In the Western tradition, Aristotle's view-the primacy of being
over becoming, of substance over process-won handily.73 The fall of
procedure to a second-order consideration in legal thought 74 mirrors
the subordination of change to substance in philosophical thought.7 -
Accepting the idea of procedure as the agency by which the
substance of entitlements changes does not require the overthrow of
the Western philosophical tradition.7 6 It does not require that a person
see procedure as "more important" or even "as important" as
substance. Nor does it require a person to believe that procedure and
substance are the same, that procedure is inherently substantive, or
that substance is inherently procedural; 77 on the contrary, there is an
72. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 71, at 81 (stating that "in the case of things that are, the
primary object is substance" and that "the fundamental duty of philosophers , . . is to gain
possession of the principles and causes of substances").
73. See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 45 (1929) (discussing "the evil
produced by the Aristotelian 'primary substance' "); see also RESCHER, supra note 25, at 4 ("I[1t
does not stretch matters unduly to say that the Aristotelean view of the primacy of substance
and its ramifications . . . have proved to be decisive for much of Western philosophy."). But see
NICHOLAS RESCHER, PROCESS METAPHYSICS 10-12 (1996) (discussing ways in which Aristotle
drew on process ideas). For a short treatment of the meaning of "substance" in the works of
Aristotle and other Western philosophers, see Howard Robinson, Substance, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2009), available at http:/plato.
stanford.edu/entries/substance.
Eastern philosophical traditions have generally accorded the idea of change a higher place in
philosophical thought. See, e.g., Chung-ying Cheng, The Origins of Chinese Philosophy, in
COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 493, 501-06 (Brian Carr & Indira Mahalingan
eds., 1997) (discussing centrality of change and process in Chinese philosophy); JOHN M. KOLLER,
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES 157-65 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the importance of the idea of becoming
in Buddhist philosophy); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 208-21 (2009) (discussing the
process-oriented and consequence-sensitive nature of nyaya in Hindi philosophy).
74. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (detailing historical differentiation
between substance and procedure).
75. I am not arguing that the subordination of legal procedure to legal substance is dictated
by the triumph of substance over process in the Western philosophical tradition. The substances
that form the basis of metaphysical reflection are objects in the real world, not abstract ideas
such as rules of law. But I am suggesting that the inattention to process and change in the
dominant Western tradition made it easy, once legal process and legal substance were
disaggregated, to downplay a body of ideas (procedure) that focuses on how changes in other
ideas (substance) occur.
76. On the other hand, familiarity with process philosophy is useful for comprehending the
idea of "procedure as change." For a helpful overview, see RESCHER, supra note 25. The modern
standard of process philosophy, renowned both for its creativity and for its impenetrability, is
Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality. WHITEHEAD, supra note 73.
77. For arguments along these lines, see Main, supra note 21.
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evident difference between the process by which a thing is created or
changed and the thing itself.
78
On the other hand, seeing procedure as the agent of change
requires more than acknowledging that the use of procedural rules
affects the outcomes of lawsuits; many judges and scholars already do
that.79 It requires embracing the idea that acting on, and changing,
the substance of legal claims is an integral part of procedure's nature,
not simply one of its unavoidable and unfortunate side effects. It
requires focusing on the flux in law and in individual legal claims over
time-and not focusing solely on the substantive entitlements of a
given moment or on the outcomes of cases. It requires seeing
substantive law as inextricably linked to, and only partially
comprehensible apart from, the process that acts on it. Anyone who
has argued for a change in a substantive entitlement, for a new
foundation for an existing entitlement, or for a particular judgment or
settlement engages in the process of changing the law. We take for
granted, and so we usually skip over as a conscious matter, the
capacity of entitlements and the value of claims to change. But
change-in other words, process-is everywhere in law.
More can be said about the idea of procedure as the agency of
change;80 this Article is designed principally to adumbrate the idea,
and then to see whether it holds any promise as a way of resolving
seemingly intractable Erie problems. It is to this latter task that I now
turn.
78. See RESCHER, supra note 25, at 25 ("[A] process is certainly not to be identified with its
usual product.").
79. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Main, supra note 21, at 801, 818-22
("[O]nly the broadest summary of this literature is necessary to remind that procedural means
can achieve substantive ends ...."); Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1463, 1472-73 (1985) (book review) (arguing that the idea of "neutral procedure" does not
exist). On some of the ways in which this change occurs, see supra notes 34-59 and
accompanying text.
80. For instance, a critical question for "procedure as the agency of change" is the role of
consequentialist, deontological, and other arguments about the content of procedural rules. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text. "Procedure as a change agent" does not obviate such
arguments, but it does affect them. First, by their nature, processes are teleologically driven;
they strive to achieve some goal with the greatest economy and efficiency possible. See RESCHER,
supra note 25, at 46-47 ("[Plragmatists and [process philosophers] alike prioritize a concern for
effectiveness and efficiency in the context of teleological processes."). Second, the idea of a
necessary content to procedural law seems inconsistent with the idea of procedure as change, for
procedural rules are as much subject to change as substantive rules are. Thus, seeing procedure
in consequentialist rather than deontological terms is the better view. But recognizing that
procedure is teleologically ordered says nothing about what sorts of change are desirable, or
what sorts of processes are most effective in achieving these ends. From a process perspective,
there remains a great deal of room to argue for the adoption of different procedural rules.
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II. VIEWING ERIE PROBLEMS THROUGH A PROCESS LENS
Understanding procedure as the agency by which substantive
law and the value of substantive claims change seemingly poses
difficulties in the Erie context. Erie requires federal courts to apply
state substantive law in diversity cases. If the nature of procedure is
to change the content and value of substantive entitlements, then it
seems that a federal court should adopt exactly the same procedures
that are used in state courts so that, at least insofar as procedural
rules determine the value of substantive claims,81 the values that a
state court and a federal court would achieve are equivalent.
Although a reasonable approach, this logic is hardly airtight.
Erie requires that the same substantive doctrine be applied in federal
court; it does not require the same substantive outcome or value be
achieved in federal court. This distinction between doctrine and value
has been the source of the conundrum in the Erie context. Virtually no
one disputes the idea that federal courts should apply the relevant
state's substantive doctrine to resolve a claim within the courts'
diversity jurisdiction.8 2  But substantive doctrine is only one
component that determines a claim's value. The hard question is
whether a federal court must also replicate, to the extent that it can,
other features that create a claim's value in state court-in particular,
whether it must apply the state court's rules of procedure, which
change a claim's value between its filing and its termination.
Two opposing answers to this conundrum would be "Always"
and "Never." Over the course of the seventy years in which it has dealt
with this problem, however, the Supreme Court has eschewed both of
these simplistic answers.83 Instead, it has assayed three distinct
approaches, all of which, in one way or another, require federal courts
to distinguish "substantive" rules (when federal courts must apply the
relevant state's rule) from "procedural" rules (when federal courts
apply their own rule). The first approach-the "formalist" approach-
regards a rule as "procedural" when it "really regulates procedure,-
81. Factors other than procedural rules also determine a claim's value. See supra notes 32-
33 and accompanying text.
82. See THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 599 (2d ed. 2008) ("It is universally
accepted that, in the absence of controlling federal law, a federal court will apply the relevant
state's substantive law.").
83. After a trilogy of cases in 1949-Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)-it seemed that the Court was moving toward a rule always
applying state rules of procedure in diversity cases. But the Court shifted course in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and after Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965), it has kept its distance from the "Always" answer.
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the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them."8 4 The second approach is the "balance
of interests" approach: a rule is "procedural" when a federal court's
policy interest in applying a federal rule outweighs the relevant state's
policy interest in having its rule applied.8 5 Third, the Court has
adopted several variants of an "outcome-determinative" approach, in
which the extent of the effect of a federal rule either on the outcome of
the case or on stated policies determines whether a rule is
"procedural."86
At present, the Court uses all three approaches, depending on
the issue at stake. For cases invoking a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (and therefore the Rules Enabling Act), the Court has
adopted the formalist approach; as long as a Federal Rule "really
regulates procedure," and as long as its effects on the outcome of the
lawsuit are merely "incidental,"87 a federal court must apply the
84. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). For further discussion of this approach,
see infra notes 87-88, 92-94, 97-104 and accompanying text.
85. The case usually cited for the "balance of interests" approach is Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), although Byrd has an alternate possible
holding and is ambiguous enough that it is not clear that the Court adopted a balancing
approach. See also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431-39 (1996) (arguably
adopting Byrds balancing approach); id. at 437 (holding that "the principal state and federal
interests can be accommodated"). For a strong endorsement of the balancing approach, see
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 233-46 (2d ed. 1990). Such a balancing approach is
common in non-Erie choice-of-law situations. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited:
How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1281-99 (1999)
(arguing that interest analysis should be relevant in determining "procedural Erie" questions).
86. The seminal case proposing an outcome-determinative test is Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Guaranty Trust seemed to adopt an ex ante approach to
outcome determination: a federal court must adopt a state rule if, when the lawsuit commences,
use of a federal rather than a state rule can be expected to yield a difference in outcome. See id.
at 109 ("In essence, the intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of
the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."). In its 1949
trilogy, the Court seemed to switch to an ex post approach to outcome determination: a federal
court must adopt a state rule when a difference in the state and federal rule does in fact lead to a
different outcome, even though that difference might not have been expected when the case
commenced. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court changed to a policy-
focused approach to outcome determination: a federal court must apply a state rule only when
failing to do so would frustrate designated policy objectives. This policy-focused approach, which
was developed as dicta in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965), is further discussed
infra notes 95, 105-07 and accompanying text.
87. The first case mentioning "incidental effects" is Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946). See also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 552 (1991) (upholding Rule 11 even though it had an "incidentar' effect on
substantive rights); Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (upholding Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38; stating that "Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights
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Federal Rule.8 8 For cases not invoking a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure but involving a common-law procedural rule,8 9 the Court
usually uses a policy-focused outcome-determinative approach: a
federal court must use a state rule of procedure when using a federal
rule would frustrate the "twin aims of Erie" (discouraging forum
shopping and avoiding inequities in outcome between state and
federal courts).90 But the "balance of interests" approach holds sway
when a state rule impinges on the jury-trial guarantee and
reexamination limitation of the Seventh Amendment.9 1
do not violate [the Rules Enabling act] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that
system of rules"); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (citing Mississippi Publishing's "incidental effects"
language). By adding an "incidental effects" coda to the formalist test, the Court moved slightly
from a purely formalist approach and added a bit of an effects approach. Thus far, however, the
Court has never used the "incidental effects" language to invalidate a Federal Rule that met the
formalist "really regulates procedure" definition.
88. In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens defected slightly from this approach and proposed a
different test for the Rules Enabling Act analysis. See infra note 97.
In addition, the formalist test requires a Federal Rule to be constitutional. Hanna, 380 U.S.
at 470-71. The Court has never invalidated a Federal Rule on constitutional grounds; in any
event, the requirement of constitutionality applies to every rule of procedure that a federal court
may permissibly adopt under any test, not just under the formalist test.
89. Although most cases involve either Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or federal common-
law rules of procedure, sometimes a federal statute dictates the relevant procedure that a federal
court must follow. In these cases, the federal statute controls as long as Congress was within its
powers in passing the statute. See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988). The same
is true if a rule of federal substantive common law dictates the outcome. See Semtek Int'l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09 (2001).
90. The "twin aims" approach was first suggested in dicta in Hanna. 380 U.S. at 468. It has
been applied to the Court's holdings in other cases. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 430; Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980) (requiring application of a state rule of procedure
when the policy of avoiding inequity was implicated, even though the policy of discouraging
forum shopping was not). Because forum shopping is likely principally when parties expect
different outcomes ex ante, and because inequities arise principally when outcomes in state and
federal court differ ex post, the "twin aims" policy-focused approach has a strong relationship to
both the ex ante outcome-determinative and the ex post outcome-determinative approaches
discussed supra note 86.
91. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-39 (reexamination clause); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40 (1958) (jury trial guarantee). Gasperini does not adopt the
"balance of interests" methodology explicitly, but its attempt to accommodate the state's interest
in obtaining a judicial check on jury decisionmaking with the federal interest in having the check
performed by the trial judge, in conjunction with its reliance on Byrd, runs a parallel course.
Some scholars argue that a 'balance of interests" approach either explains the Erie line of cases
or should be adopted as the relevant principle. See REDISH, supra note 85, at 211-46; Bauer,
supra note 85, at 1286-90. But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does
Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna
Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) ("[Alnyone who in (at least) the last ten
or so years had thought-or worse, taught-that Byrd was the dominant approach ... had not
been paying close attention to the Court's recent decisions.").
In her Shady Grove dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the balance of federal and state
interests is also relevant at the first step of the Erie analysis--determining whether a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure was broad enough to cover a case. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A.
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The Rules Enabling Act portion of the Court's analysis can be
criticized for its circularity (saying, in essence, that "a rule is
procedural when it regulates procedure") and for giving short shrift to
the second section of the Rules Enabling Act, which demands that any
rule of "practice and procedure"92 not "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."93 Be that as it may, when a case falls under the
Rules Enabling Act analysis, federal courts can almost automatically
apply a Federal Rule, regardless of the effect that the rule would have
on the outcome of the case. 94 The "twin aims" analysis operates
differently; under it, a federal court must often adopt the state rule
because using a differing federal rule can frustrate one or both of
Erie's twin policy aims.95 Therefore, because the Rules Enabling Act
test is much more likely to lead to application of the federal procedural
rule, the critical first question in any case is whether a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure covers the situation. 96 The plurality, concurrence, and
dissent in Shady Grove reflect the Court's recent fracturing on the
answer to that question, as well as some fracturing on the continuing
vitality of the formalist analysis under the Rules Enabling Act.
97
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1461-64 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see supra note 11
and accompanying text (discussing this first step). The four-vote dissent further claimed that
Justice Stevens agreed, thus forging a majority of the Court for this approach. Shady Grove, 130
S. Ct. at 1463 n.2. In any event, sensitivity to federal and state interests at this stage of the
analysis is different from balancing state and federal interests to determine which system's
procedural rules should apply.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
93. Id. § 2072(b). These criticisms have often been made in the academic literature. For one
famous iteration of the arguments, see Ely, supra note 8, at 718-40. At the time that Professor
Ely wrote, there was no section 2072(b); rather, its present language, in slightly modified form,
was contained in the second sentence of section 2072. For the then-extant text, see Act of June
19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2006)).
94. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (noting that "we have rejected
every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us").
95. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (applying Oklahoma
statute regarding the commencement of a lawsuit in federal diversity suit to avoid "inequitable
administration" of law); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949)
(applying Kansas statute of limitations so that parties invoking diversity jurisdiction would not
"gain advantages over those confined to state courts'); Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 110 (1945) (applying New York statute of limitations for similar reasons).
96. See supra notes 11, 91 and accompanying text.
97. Fractures were already apparent before Shady Grove. Gasperini, which was the Court's
last "procedural Erie" case before Shady Grove, was a 5-4 decision; most of Shady Grove's
dissenters were in the majority (including Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the opinion), with Justice
Scalia writing the dissent. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). But the
fractures expanded in Shady Grove. Justice Scalia's plurality decision thought that Rule 23
covered the case; after applying the "really regulates procedure" test dictated by the Rules
Enabling Act analysis, see supra note 84 and accompanying text, it upheld the use of the Rule 23.
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431 at 1442-44. Justice Stevens' concurrence agreed that Rule 23
covered the situation, id. at 1456-57, but argued for replacing the formalist test with a new test
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Viewed from the perspective of "procedure as the agency of
change," what is striking about the Court's approaches, as well as the
present fractures in Shady Grove, is the pervasive unwillingness to
address squarely the central feature of procedure: that the very
essence of procedure is to change legal entitlements and the value of
the legal claims that implicate these entitlements. This problem is
particularly evident with the formalist approach. As Justice Scalia
said in applying this approach in Shady Grove, the "consequence[s)" of
applying Rule 23 are irrelevant even though the plaintiffs' claims in
Shady Grove had no positive value-and would almost certainly never
have been filed-in a New York state court.98 He described the
outcome-influencing effect of Rule 23, which gave the claims positive
value and made the lawsuit viable, as merely "incidental."99 Moreover,
he stated that the substantive purpose of the class-action bar under
New York state law, which was designed precisely to thwart the filing
of class actions for small-scale claims such as Shady Grove's, "makes
no difference" in the analysis. 100 The willful blindness of this approach
to the claim-affecting nature of legal process does not make the result
achieved by the Shady Grove plurality wrong, but an approach so
blind to procedure's nature will not always find the best solution to the
Erie conundrum: When should a federal court replicate the outcome
that would be achieved in state court? The problem is especially acute
because a clear cost of this approach is the deliberate sidestepping of
that gave greater emphasis to the "abridge, enlarge or modify" language of § 2072(b): In addition
to requiring that a Federal Rule "really regulate[ ] procedure," id. at 1452, Justice Stevens would
have required that the Federal Rule not "displace a State's definition of its own rights or
remedies," id. at 1449. Justice Ginsburg's dissent thought that Rule 23 was not broad enough to
control the case, id. at 1465-69; applying the "procedural Erie" half of the analysis, the dissent
then thought that the difference between the federal rule (presumably allowing a class action,
although under what authority is unclear once Rule 23 was deemed insufficiently broad to apply)
and the state rule (not allowing a class action) would induce forum shopping in favor of federal
courts because "substantial variations between state and federal [money judgments] may be
expected." Id. at 1469, 1471 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 430) (alteration in original)). Thus,
the dissent argued, the federal court needed to apply the New York rule.
Because it did not see the case as a Rules Enabling Act matter, Justice Ginsburg's dissent
did not indicate whether it agreed with Justice Stevens' revised Rules Enabling Act analysis. Cf.
id. at 1463 n.2 (stating points of agreement and disagreement between Justice Stevens and the
dissent on other matters). Three of the four justices in the plurality (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Thomas) indicated their disagreement with Justice Stevens' approach to the
Rules Enabling Act, id. at 1444-47; Justice Sotomayor did not join this portion of the opinion.
Whether Justice Stevens' opinion signals a shift in the Rules Enabling Act analysis remains
unclear at this time. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010
WL 2756947, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010) (adopting Justice Stevens' approach because his
opinion provided the "crucial fifth vote" in Shady Grove).
98. 130 S. Ct. at 1443.
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 1444.
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the Rule Enabling Act's "abridge, enlarge or modify" language. In
doing so, the Rules Enabling Act analysis in practice approaches the
"Never" answer that the Court has declined to adopt in theory, and
thus fails to respect the separation-of-powers and federalism concerns
that underlie both Erie and the Rules Enabling Act.
That said, the formalist approach has three positive aspects.
First, the "really regulates procedure" definition acknowledges that
procedure is indeed a process that operates on claims from their filing
to their conclusion in court. 10 1 Second, the definition emphasizes the
distinction between the process of enforcing entitlements and the
output of that process. Put differently, even though procedure has
"substantive" effects, it does not thereby become "substantive" law;
substantive law "alter[s] the rights themselves, the available
remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court adjudicate[s]
either."10 2 These two points may be obvious, but as I will explain, they
are also important.
10 3
Third, the formalist approach resolves, albeit unsatisfactorily,
a fundamental interpretive issue under the Rules Enabling Act. If, as
the "procedure as the agency of change" thesis holds, the use of every
rule of procedure changes the strength of entitlements and the value
of claims, 10 4 then all rules of procedure "abridge, enlarge or modify...
substantive right[s]" in violation of § 2072(b). Thus, the Federal Rules
that the Court can promulgate consistent with the Enabling Act are a
null set. But Congress did not intend to pass a statute whose internal
contradictions rendered it a nullity. Some account of the meaning of
§ 2072(b) must be given; and while it is easy to criticize the formalist
"solution" (which would presumably strike down a Federal Rule only if
its substantive effects were not "incidental"), its approach highlights
the need to interpret the Rules Enabling Act in a way that gives
meaning to § 2072(b) without gutting the rulemaking authority of
§ 2072(a).
This interpretive problem would also pose enormous problems
for the outcome-determinative approach if the Court were to employ it
in the Enabling Act context; but, as we have seen, this approach has
101. Sibbach's definition bears re-emphasis: a Federal Rule is valid when it "really regulates
procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (emphasis added).
102. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443; see also id. at 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment) (describing "substantive rights" as those that "pertain to the scope of any state
right or remedy at issue in the litigation" or, arguably, are "intertwined with a state right or
remedy").
103. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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been confined to the "procedural Erie" (or Rules of Decision Act) side of
the analysis. Otherwise, the strengths and weaknesses of the outcome-
determinative approach are essentially mirror images of the strengths
and weaknesses of the formalist approach. By focusing on the effects
of procedure, an outcome-determinative test acknowledges procedure's
true nature. On the other hand, by seeing procedure solely in terms of
the outcomes it produces, this approach confuses the process of
creating something with what the process creates. Even though
procedure changes substantive entitlements or values, process is
never itself substantive.
The near inevitability that different processes will lead to
different outcomes105  poses another problem for the outcome-
determinative approach. Because process inevitably changes
substance, one can anticipate ex ante that differences in federal rules
will lead to a different outcome than the state court would have
achieved; and, except in the rare case in which different processes lead
to an identical outcome, one can show ex post that the federal and
state processes will lead to different outcomes. Unless the Court is
willing to answer "Always" to the Erie conundrum (and it has never
formally done S0106), what is required to make the outcome-
determinative approach work is some sort of threshold-a point below
which variances in outcome, due to the use of the federal rule rather
than the state rule, do not matter.
The Court's present "policy-focused" approach is one possible
threshold; a federal court need not concern itself with variances so
small that they are unlikely to impinge on stated policies (for example,
forum shopping and inequity). Both of these policies imply some
quantitative threshold at work; forum shopping is unlikely to occur,
and inequity will not exist, unless the variance in outcome due to the
use of a federal rather than a state rule is sufficiently large. We might
derive this threshold from differences in absolute value (for example,
variances in outcome exceeding $1,000), in percentage (for example,
variances in outcome exceeding one percent of the value of the claim),
or in some other quantitative measure (for example, variances in
outcome that are "substantial" or "significant"10 7). None of these
thresholds, however, has much to do with the nature of process itself.
105. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
107. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 (1996) (requiring the use of
a state rule when "'substantial variations between state and federal [money judgments]' may be
expected") (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)) (alteration in original); id. at
431 ("Erie precludes a recovery in federal court significantly larger than the recovery that would
have been tolerated in state court.").
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Because of its limited use, the "balance of interests" approach
needs less consideration. Given both the non-outcome-related and the
outcome-related interests of the federal and state governments in
applying their own rules, an obvious criticism of the balancing
approach is the difficulty in weighing incommensurable goods.
108
Moreover, by focusing on the way in which the use of a federal or a
state procedural rule affects the interests of the federal and state
governments, rather than the strength of entitlements and the value
of claims, this approach removes itself by at least one level from the
nature of process.
From the perspective of "procedure as the agency of change,"
the Court's present bifurcated approach to Rules Enabling
Act/"procedural Erie" issues suffers from a final flaw: it is inelegant.
As Justice Harlan recognized in Hanna,109 "procedure" is a single
thing-the process that resolves claims and legal entitlements.
Nothing more, and nothing less. To have one definition of procedure
for Rules Enabling Act purposes, and another for "procedural Erie"
purposes, creates two definitions of a single concept-neither of them
precisely correct. 110
I understand that it is still fashionable to believe that, as
Walter Wheeler Cook famously observed more than seventy-five years
ago, "[t]he tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or
more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose,
has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them.., has all
108. For this reason, and because of the ease with which government interests can be
manipulated to ensure the application of forum law, interest analysis remains an unpopular
method in the horizontal choice-of-law context when true conflicts exist. See EUGENE F. SCOLES
FT AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.20-24 (4th ed. 2004) (analyzing each American state's choice-of-
law approach and identifying only three jurisdictions-California, the District of Columbia, and
New Jersey-that use interest analysis for tort claims and none that use it for contract claims);
id. § 2.9 (discussing interest analysis and its benefits and difficulties); see also P.V. ex rel. T.V. v.
Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 460 (N.J. 2008) (rejecting interest analysis in tort cases); cf. Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 n.7 (2010) (Scalia, J.)
(calling "[tihe search for state interests and policies that are 'important' ... standardless"); Ely,
supra note 8, at 709 (noting that Byrd, which is often seen as the case best exemplifying the
"balance of interests" approach in the Erie line of cases, "exhibits a confusion that exceeds even
that normally surrounding a balancing test").
109. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
110. Of course, there is the difference in statutes; a court must interpret the Rules Enabling
Act when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is involved, and it must interpret the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006), when a federal common-law rule of procedure is involved.
See Ely, supra note 8, at 698. The Rules of Decision Act nowhere mentions either the word
"procedure" or the words "substance" or "substantive right," and the Rules Enabling Act never
defines either "procedure" or "substantive right." Therefore, as long as the Court hews to the
view that the Rules of Decision Act requires a federal court to apply only state "substantive" law,
the two statutes operate over the same field and with the same concerns, so the argument for
creating differing definitions to describe a single phenomenon of process is not evident.
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the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded
against." ' In particular, Professor Cook was arguing that the words
"substance" and "procedure" shift meanings depending on the context
of their use. Most present-day scholars and lawyers subscribe to this
view.11
2
Perhaps it is time to revisit this old wisdom. As I said at the
beginning of this Section, the Erie conundrum is that we always want
federal courts to adopt state substantive law, and sometimes-but not
always-we want federal courts to achieve, as nearly as rules can
guarantee, the same substantive outcome as a state court would have
achieved. When we want substantive outcomes to match up, making
the substantive law match up isn't enough; because process affects
outcome, we need the process to match up as well. When we don't
believe that a federal court needs to obtain the same outcome as a
state court would have obtained, we allow the federal court to adopt
its own process. But the process that a federal court would adopt if left
to its own devices is no less a process-no less procedural-in the
former case than in the latter. Calling such a process "substantive" in
the former case does not make it so; it is still a process, not an
outcome-still procedure, not substance.
So the conundrum remains: Why and when do we want federal
courts to replicate the outcome that a state court would have
achieved? It is not obvious that this answer should differ in the Rules
Enabling Act and "procedural Erie" contexts. I do not mean to say that
the Court's present bifurcated approach is unintelligible or
unreasonable. But it would be more elegant if we could find a single
answer that explained the Court's intuitions about when a federal
court must strive to achieve the outcome that a state court would have
achieved, but that did not rely on circular definitions or the subterfuge
of labeling rules of procedure as "substantive."
111. Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333, 337 (1933).
112. For instance, Justice Frankfurter noted that "[n]either 'substance' nor 'procedure'
represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular
problem for which it is used." Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); see also
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ('The line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts
as the legal context changes."). For a comparable observation from another common-law system,
see Matthews v. Ministry of Defence, [2003] UKHL 4 at [33], [2003] 1 A.C. 1163 (H.L.) 1179
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K) (noting the fundamental distinction between procedure and
substance, but acknowledging that it "is a slippery one"); see also 1 DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7-004 (Lawrence Collins ed., 14th ed. 2006) ("In drawing [the
distinction between procedure and substance], regard should be had in each case to the purpose
for which the distinction is being used and to the consequences of the decision in the instant
context.").
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III. A SINGLE PRINCIPLE FOR ERIE CASES
Most analysts argue that some of the cases in the Erie line are
correct in their reasoning and result and the remainder are wrong in
their reasoning, result, or both.1 13 Because the reasoning in this group
of cases has meandered, with later cases often making or emphasizing
distinctions not apparent in the earlier cases, 114 it probably is
impossible to deem each Erie case "correct" in its reasoning-at least if
the measure of "correctness" is logical consistency across the entire
line of cases. But, despite its meandering, the Court has never
disavowed the result that it has reached in any of the Rules Enabling
Act or "procedural Erie" cases.
That fact deserves more attention than it usually gets, and it
forms the starting point for any attempt to state an adequate theory of
the Erie line of cases. An adequate theory assumes that all of the
Rules Enabling Act and "procedural Erie" cases are right in their
result-even Gasperini and Shady Grove, which are in obvious tension
due to the reversal in roles of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, both of
whom adhered in Shady Grove to their views in Gasperini.115 The
issue then becomes: On what single principle can all these results be
descriptively and normatively justified?
A. Describing the Principle
The answer begins with the idea of "procedure as the agency of
change"-that legal process takes a claim of a certain strength and
113. For one article arguing the Court generally had handled everything about right, see
Rowe, supra note 91, at 963-66. But see id. at 987, 1010-11 (critiquing the Byrd '"balance of
interest" approach). At the time of the article, Shady Grove had not yet been decided. In
correspondence with me, Professor Rowe has suggested some disagreement with the
majority/plurality opinion in Shady Grove.
114. On the changes to the outcome-determinative test from Guaranty Trust to Ragan to
Hanna, see supra note 86 and accompanying text. On the change in analytical approach from
Gasperini to Shady Grove, see supra note 97 and accompanying text. On the fractured views
exhibited in Shady Grove itself, see 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
Of course, the Court has tried to bring all of the cases within one house. Hanna was a
herculean effort to reconcile all of the prior cases and to create logical consistency out of a
patchwork of results and reasons. But Hanna was unable to fashion a single principle and broke
the analysis into two parts. Even then, Professor Ely argued that one of the pre.Hanna cases,
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., was wrong in reasoning and possibly in result in light of Hanna. Ely,
supra note 8, at 733-38.
115. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the outcome in Shady Grove could not be
reconciled with the approach taken or outcome reached in Gasperini. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at
1464, 1468, 1469, 1471-72. Justice Scalia cited Gasperini only once, and only in response to a
quotation that the dissent had pulled from the case-a deafening silence that suggests he too
found it either difficult or undesirable to square the cases. Id. at 1441 n.7.
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value at the time that it enters the litigation system, changes the
claim and its underlying legal entitlement by means of the processes
applied in litigation, and ultimately arrives at a final value. If we
focus on the claim at the moment the plaintiff presents it in court, we
can assign it a specific value, determined by multiplying the
probability of recovery by the amount of the recovery, and then
subtracting the expected costs of litigation. If P represents the
probability of recovery, L the amount of recovery, and C the costs of
procedure, then the net ex ante value of the claim (V) is determined by
the formula V = (P x L) - C.116
As we have seen, the process that a court applies from the
point of filing onward then changes the value of P, L, or C.117 If we
ignore the operation of these rules, we back the costs (C) and some of
the influences on P and L out of the equation. We can now focus on the
remaining inputs into P and L, which together define the pre-filing
value (or substance) of the claim in a world in which the procedure
employed is costless and has no influence on substantive outcomes.
118
In this world, the probability of recovery (P) depends on influences
such as the strength of the legal entitlement on which the claim is
based, 119 the facts known at the time of filing,
1 20 the burden of proof,' 21
116. See supra notes 17, 34. The amount P x L is the average of the sum of all the possible
outcomes for the case, from the lowest amount ($0 in most situations) to the highest possible
award permitted under the law of remedies, weighted by the probability of achieving each
outcome. I assume risk neutrality.
117. See supra notes 34-59 and accompanying text. It is also possible that the same process
might affect more than one of these variables. See Horowitz & Bordens, Aggregation, supra note
44, at 225-28 (discussing how aggregation can affect both the probability of recovery and the
amount of recovery).
118. This assumption draws on the Coase Theorem, which posits that, in the absence of
transaction costs, any legal rule is allocatively efficient. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Transaction costs include litigation costs and the costs of
error. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. If we include within the meaning of "error" the
difference in value achieved when a federal court employs its own rules to process a state-law
claim rather than the rules a state court would have employed to process the same claim, then
we can define the value of a claim at the moment of its filing as its expected value in the absence
of transaction costs.
119. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938) (holding that, in a diversity case, a
federal court must apply the state's substantive law regarding the elements of a claim); see also
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (stating in dicta that, in a diversity case, a federal
court must apply the state's law regarding the contributory-negligence defense); cf. Semtek Int'l
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (declining in a diversity case to read
Rule 41 as stating a rule of claim preclusion due to arguable Rules Enabling Act issues that
would arise). In order to determine the strength of the entitlement and defenses, a court must
know which state's substantive law is applicable. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487, 496-98 (1941) (holding that, in a diversity case, a federal court must apply the same
choice-of-law rule as a state court in the forum state would have applied).
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and other limitations on the ability of a party to file a claim or present
a defense (such as statutes of limitations, 122 compliance with notice
provisions 123 and other pre-filing requirements, 124 the capacity to sue
or be sued, 125 and the like). The recovery (L) depends on the law and
facts establishing rights or defenses, as well as the remedies that are
available when a violation of a right occurs; it is limited to the
maximum amount supportable under the remedial law. 126
Once we establish these inputs into P x L in this hypothetical
world of costless and outcome-neutral procedure, the court's process
for resolving the claim takes over and changes this ex ante expected
value. If the case proceeds in federal court, the court must now
establish a method of serving a defendant, even though that method
might lead to a different value for the claim than the method chosen
in state court. 2 7 A federal court must determine which facts the
120. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503 (suggesting that, in a diversity case, a Federal Rule
creating a rule of preclusion, presumably including a rule of issue preclusion, would "abridge,
enlarge or modify" a "substantive right" in violation of the Rules Enabling Act).
121. See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1939) (holding that a federal
court in a diversity case must apply the relevant state's burden of proof on matters relating to
substantive claims); Palmer, 318 U.S. at 117 (same with respect to defenses).
122. See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-11 (1946) (holding that, in a
diversity case, a federal court should apply the relevant state's statute of limitations rather than
the federal equitable doctrine of laches). The applicability of the statute of limitations may hinge
on contingencies that have not come to pass when the complaint is filed. See Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 749, 751-53 (1980) (requiring a federal court in a diversity case to apply a
state rule that does not toll the statute of limitations until service, rather than the federal rule
tolling the statute on the filing of the complaint); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949) (same). For further discussion of Ragan and Walker, see infra note
142 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A) (requiring a party bringing a shareholders'
derivative action to plead any pre-filing efforts "to obtain the desired action" from the board of
directors or others).
124. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1949) (describing a
New Jersey statute requiring a shareholder to post a bond before proceeding with a derivative
suit). For further discussion, see infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
125. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 536 n.1 (1949) (describing a
Mississippi statute that required a corporation to be licensed to do business in the state before it
could bring suit in a state court).
126. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-31 (1996) (requiring a
federal court in a diversity case to adopt the state's more restrictive "deviates materially"
standard rather than the federal "shock the conscience" standard for establishing the maximum
permissible recovery on a state-law claim); id. at 428-29 (suggesting that a federal court must
also adopt a state-law cap on damages).
127. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-70 (1965) (permitting a federal court in a
diversity case to use a method of service different from the method used in state court); Miss.
Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 441-46 (1946) (permitting a federal court in a diversity
case to use a method of service that would bring a defendant before a district court other than
the district encompassing the geographical area in which service occurred). For further
discussion of Hanna, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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lawyers can permissibly obtain in proof of the claims or defenses, even
if the proofs that the lawyers could obtain in state court might have
led a state court to evaluate the entitlement or value the claim
differently. 128 A federal court must determine the identity of the
factfinder, even though a state court's differing allocation of
factfinding responsibility might result in a different outcome. 129 The
same is true with respect to the allocation of post-trial responsibility
among trial and appellate judges, 130 as well as the mechanics of
appeal.' 31 Likewise, a federal court must regulate the behavior of the
lawyers and parties involved in processing the claim, even though the
degree of regulation might vary from that in state court.132 In all these
ways, a federal court, the lawyers, and the parties take the claim's ex
ante expected value and continually create a new claim value with the
application of subprocesses (pleading, discovery, trial, appeal, and so
on) until the claim reaches a final value.
We can therefore synthesize an operative principle that
determines which rules a federal court must adopt in a diversity case:
In a diversity case, in the absence of a federal statute or
constitutional provision requiring a different result, a federal
court must use its own rules to process a claim, except that it
must apply any rule that a state court sitting in that district
would apply if (a) the state court's rule would yield an ex ante
expected value for the claim different from the ex ante expected
value that the federal court's rule would yield, and (b) the
federal court's rule does not describe a part of the post-filing
process by which the court, the lawyers, or the parties change
the ex ante expected value into its final value.
33
128. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1941) (requiring a party in a diversity
case to submit to a Rule 35 examination, even though such examinations were not permitted
under the state's rules of discovery).
129. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 533-40 (1958) (requiring
that a jury in a diversity case determine a factual issue, even though the issue would be
determined by a judge in state court).
130. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-39 (holding that a federal court in a diversity case can
allocate post-trial review of an allegedly excessive verdict to the trial judge, even though a state
court would allocate this responsibility to an appellate judge).
131. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1987) (holding that a federal court in
a diversity case need not follow a state court's requirements with respect to posting a bond on
appeal). For further discussion, see infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
132. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551-54 (1991)
(holding that Rule 11 did not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," even though
Rule 11 overlaps in its coverage with state-law claims for malicious prosecution).
133. "Ex ante expected value" is a shorthand that refers to the net value of a claim ((P x L) -
Q, measured at the time of filing. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. As Kevin Clermont
has helpfully pointed out, I could write the principle more simply by deleting part (a). I retain
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An equivalent statement of the principle is this: a federal court must
apply the rule of a state court if and only if the rule affects either the
probability (P) or the amount (L) of recovery in a world in which the
post-filing process for resolving a claim is costless and outcome-
neutral.
This principle incorporates the strengths of both the formalist
and the outcome-determinative approaches. First, it avoids the
inelegance of using two definitions for "procedure."134 A single
principle determines the choice of rule, regardless of whether the state
rule conflicts with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or a federal
common-law procedural rule. Second, it recognizes that the substance
of a claim at any given instant is distinct from the process that acts on
the claim during the course of litigation; it does not confuse the results
that a process yields (substance) with the process itself.135 Third, it
acknowledges, albeit with an important clarifying amendment, the
Court's basic intuitions that "rights and remedies" are for state courts
to determine, but that the "process" to enforce and resolve these rights
and remedies is for the federal court to determine. 136 The clarifying
amendment, of course, is that a federal procedural rule is invalid if it
changes the "ex ante expected value of the rights and remedies"-in
other words, the rule must leave intact not only rights and remedies,
but also the rules of limitation (statutes of limitations, capacity to sue,
and the like) that affect the probability of recovery. It is this ex ante
expected value (probability multiplied by recovery), and the inputs
into this expected value, that no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure can
change and remain faithful to the command of the Rules Enabling Act.
It is exactly the same value-rather than the "twin aims of Erie"-
that federal common-law rules must not disturb in order to remain
faithful to Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the "procedural Erie"
line of cases.
part (a) because it emphasizes the meaning of "substance" (i.e., "ex ante expected value") that is
critical for reconciling the Court's cases. It also emphasizes the need for a "true conflict" between
the state and federal rules. If both rules would yield the same net value for the claim at the time
of its filing, then the federal rule has no effect on any substantive right and the federal court may
permissibly apply its own rule.
134. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
135. This was one of the strengths of the formalist view and a weakness of the outcome-
determinative view. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; supra text preceding note 105.
136. Again, this was a strength of the formalist approach. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text. For a comparable distinction in the outcome-determinative context, see
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945) (permitting federal courts to
apply their own rules regarding "the manner and the means by which a right to recover ... is
enforced," but requiring that state law be adopted in diversity cases when the law "bears on a
State-created right" or "intimately affect[s] recovery or non-recovery').
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Fourth, this principle does not shun the reality, which the
Court has repeatedly acknowledged, 137 that process invariably
changes the real-world strength and value of rights and remedies.
138
Instead, while acknowledging (indeed, embracing) this fact, it can still
cabin off changes that matter for Erie purposes from those that do not.
Finally, this principle provides a solution to the interpretive
dilemma of the Rules Enabling Act, without employing the blinders of
the formalist approach. 139 Given that using any rule of procedure
affects legal entitlements and the substantive value of claims, the
interpretive problem of the Rules Enabling Act is to give some effect to
the "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" language
without wiping out every procedural rule that might be promulgated
under it. The principle's solution is simple: the "substantive right"
that counts for the purpose of the Enabling Act is the ex ante expected
value that the parties bring into the case. While more technical and
precise than we might assay in ordinary conversation, this definition
accords perfectly with the usual meaning of "substantive right": an
entitlement measured without regard to the ways in which the judicial
process affects the entitlement. The only "twist" that the principle
adopts is to tie the measurement of the right to a specific point in
time: the time at which the case is filed. No Federal Rule can "abridge,
enlarge or modify" the rules that would determine the strength or
value of this "substantive right" in a state court. But if a Federal Rule
affects the value of an entitlement or a claim in other ways, it passes
muster under the Rules Enabling Act.
Thus, the principle interprets § 2072(a) and § 2072(b) in a way
that gives both provisions meaning. Section 2072(a) ensures that the
rule describes a process (or part of a process) that courts, lawyers, and
parties use to resolve claims. Section 2072(b) ensures that this rule of
process does not "abridge, enlarge or modify"-in other words,
change-a claim's ex ante expected value in a world of costless and
outcome-neutral process.
At the same time, the principle explains why the Court has
never invalidated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, but it has
invalidated some federal common-law procedural rules. At present,
137. See supra notes 3, 86, 98 and accompanying text; see also Miss. Publ'g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) ('Jndoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and
procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants.").
138. Acknowledging this reality is one of the strengths of the outcome-determinative
approach. See supra text preceding note 105.
139. Recognizing the need to solve the interpretive dilemma of the Rules Enabling Act was a
strength of the formalist approach, but the solution itself was not. See supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
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the Federal Rules describe only the process by which a claim is
resolved; they change the post-filing values of the entitlements and
claims in dispute, but no Rule-at least not yet-has ever affected the
expected value that the claim carries into the litigation. Moreover, the
completeness with which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describe
the post-filing process leaves little room for federal procedural
common law in the post-filing process. Hence, it is not surprising that
most of the common-law procedural rules that the Court has
considered-for instance, the use of laches rather than a statute of
limitations in Guaranty Trust-have not concerned the process by
which a claim is resolved after it enters the litigation system (an area
well covered by the Federal Rules), but instead have shaped the value
of the claim before it enters the system. 140 As Erie shows, these latter
rules must give way to differing state rules. Although the Federal
Rules have thus far stayed away from stating rules of this type,
someday a Federal Rule might veer into forbidden territory.
141
Therefore, both provisions of the Rules Enabling Act remain
important.
It is important to handle carefully the distinction between rules
that affect ex ante expected value and rules that describe the process
of resolving the claim. Making the distinction is not a matter of
determining when the rule is applied or becomes fixed; for every
140. The exceptions are the use of a jury rather than a judge as factfinder in Byrd, and the
use of a trial judge rather than an appellate judge as the reviewer of damage awards in
Gasperini. Both federal common-law rules affected only the post-filing value of the claims at
stake, not their pre-filing value in a world of costless procedure. (Recall that error cost, which
arguably occurs when a federal court assigns a different factfinder or judge than the state court
would, is a type of transaction cost. See supra note 34.) And in both cases, the Supreme Court
allowed the federal court to use its own rule.
141. On several occasions, the Court has read a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure narrowly to
avoid an arguable clash with the Rules Enabling Act. See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (declining to read Rule 41 as stating a rule of claim preclusion);
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (noting that "[tlhe Rules Enabling Act
underscores the need for caution" in interpreting Rule 23); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (same). As I have suggested, the Court's concern for adopting Federal Rules
that create rules of preclusion is well-founded; such rules affect the pre-filing value of claims. See
supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. On the other hand, as I indicate momentarily, the
Court's concern for Rules Enabling Act violations in the Rule 23 context is misplaced, because a
broader or narrower view of a class action's scope affects only the claims' post-filing value. See
infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
Aside from running afoul of either § 2072(a) or § 2072(b) as a facial matter, a Federal Rule
might also violate the Rules Enabling Act as applied in a particular case. See Douglas v. NCNB
Tex. Nat'l Bank, 979 F.2d 1128, 1129-31 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply the compulsory-
counterclaim rule of Federal Rule 13(a) when the defendant had a right under state law to seek a
non-judicial remedy). Because Douglas involved a rule of preclusion, its as-applied rejection of
the compulsory-counterclaim rule seems appropriate. I thank Tom Rowe for pointing out the
possibility of as-applied challenges to Federal Rules.
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rule-whether a rule of substantive doctrine or a rule that requires
briefs to be filed on 8 " x 11" paper-is applied only after the filing of
a claim, and every rule is contingent on facts and developments that
arise during the litigation process. What is critical is that the federal
rule not change the contingency that triggers a rule affecting the
probability of recovery (P) or amount of recovery (L) in a world of
costless and outcome-neutral procedure.
Take Ragan, Walker, and Hanna as examples. 142 In the first
two cases the statutes of limitations, which were tolled only when the
defendant was served, had not yet run when the cases were filed.
Statutes of limitations affect the probability of recovery (P) even in a
world of costless and outcome-neutral post-filing procedure. Whether
the statutes of limitations would in fact cut off the plaintiffs' claims in
Ragan and Walker depended on a contingency yet to occur at the time
of filing: whether service was made before the expiration of the
statute. The effect of the "tolling at service" contingency on the ex ante
expected value of the claim could be stated in probabilistic terms (for
instance, in Ragan there was, say, a five percent chance that service
would not occur in time and the statute would terminate the lawsuit).
By reducing the probability that the statute of limitations would
terminate the plaintiffs' claims to zero, the differing federal rule-
tolling when the complaint was filed-changed this probability
impermissibly. The federal rule thus fell within the terms of part (a) of
the principle. Because statutes of limitations do not describe a part of
the process by which claims are resolved, the federal rule also fell
within the terms of part (b) of the principle. The lesson of Ragan and
Walker is that federal courts cannot adopt rules altering those post-
filing contingencies that affect the ex ante expected value of claims in
a world of costless and outcome-neutral procedure.
Hanna is a different case. The state rule-in-hand service on
executors of estates-also involved a post-filing contingency (whether
or not the executor received in-hand service). The federal rule--
permitting service by means other than in-hand service--changed the
contingency. But the federal rule on service described a part of the
post-filing process for resolving the claim; put differently, if we
assume a world of costless and outcome-neutral post-filing procedure
for resolving claims, either rule of service would by definition have led
to the same outcome. Thus, the federal rule of service fell outside of
part (b). Hanna correctly permitted the federal rule on service to
control.
142. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 749 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse, 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
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The same analysis also explains the puzzling difference
between Cohen143 and Burlington Northern.144 In Cohen, a federal
court was required to apply the state court's rule requiring the posting
of a bond when litigation commenced, even though no Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure required such a bond. In Burlington Northern, a
federal court was not required to apply the state court's rule requiring
the losing party to post an appeal bond when the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure were equally silent on the need for such a bond.
The bond requirement in Cohen affected the ex ante probability of
recovery (for the lack of a bond resulted in dismissal, while the
procurement of the bond left open the possibility of recovery); 145 in
addition, because the bond needed to be procured when litigation
commenced, it was not part of the post-filing process for resolving the
claim. Thus, the state-court rule requiring a bond met both part (a)
and part (b) of the principle, and the federal court was required to
adopt the state-court bond requirement. On the other hand, the bond
requirement in Burlington Northern failed part (b), for the federal rule
eschewing an appeal bond was part of the post-filing process for
resolving the claim. Thus, the federal court was free to select its own
rule.
B. Applying the Principle to Shady Grove
We can further understand this principle by seeing how it
operates in the Court's most recent case, Shady Grove. The plaintiff in
Shady Grove alleged that the defendant violated New York law in
failing to process its $500 claim in a timely fashion.146 Because the
claim was so small, it presented a classic "negative-value" situation: it
would have cost more than the claim was worth to bring it as a
separate action. One of the points of Rule 23, which allows a class
representative to bring claims on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, is to overcome the negative-value problem; by aggregating
claims, the class members achieve economies of scale that make the
claims worth bringing. 47 Thus, by filing a class action in federal court,
143. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
144. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1980).
145. In a costless procedural world, such a bond requirement would be pointless, since its
purpose is to hold the defendant harmless from litigation costs in the event that the plaintiff
loses. But the pointlessness of the rule is irrelevant; the only relevant issue is whether
noncompliance with the rule would affect the ex ante probability of recovery.
146. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436-37
(2010).
147. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that '[t]he policy
at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries
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the plaintiff hoped to turn an economically unviable claim into a
viable one. The problem, of course, was a New York rule that forbade
the use of class actions in cases seeking a penalty,148 which the
plaintiffs claim did. 149 Obviously, the choice between the federal and
the New York rule was critical: without class aggregation, the expense
of litigation made the claim cost-prohibitive to prosecute, and would
have likely forced the plaintiff to drop the case. With class
aggregation, however, the case could proceed.
So is the federal court permitted to use Rule 23 to resolve the
claim, or is it required to use the state rule barring class actions?
Applying the principle described above, we begin by asking whether
Rule 23 is a "rule used to process a claim." It obviously is; Rule 23
describes a process that a court can use to help move the case from its
expected value to its final value.
Next, we move on to parts (a) and (b), which together examine
the effect of Rule 23 on the ex ante expected value of the plaintiffs'
claims in a costless and outcome-neutral procedural world. For
present purposes we can assume that, like Shady Grove, each class
member had a $500 claim; the exact amounts are not relevant. We can
also assume that, like Shady Grove, each class member had a fifty
percent chance of success; again, the exact number does not matter in
this case. These assumptions yield an ex ante value, at the time of
filing, of $250 for each plaintiffs claim of untimely payment.
With this number fixed, we turn to Rule 23, the procedural rule
at stake, to see if it affects this ex ante value in a costless and
outcome-neutral world. The answer is that it does not. In the first
place, Rule 23 does not affect or change the law requiring timely
payment. Nor does it change the burden of proof, alter any legal
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights' ") (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that using Rule 23 can
"transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award"); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748
(5th Cir. 1996) (noting that "[t]he most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class
action [is] the existence of a negative-value suit ...."). For a classic article on large-scale, small-
stakes litigation and the agency-cost problems they pose, see generally Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
148. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2006) provides in full:
Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a
penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be
maintained as a class action.
149. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. Somewhat more precisely, the district court held that
the claim, which sought to collect statutory interest, was in effect a claim seeking a penalty. The
Supreme Court did not challenge this characterization. Id.
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limitations on the plaintiffs' ability to bring a suit (for example, the
statute of limitations), or change the remedies available. In a world in
which the process for resolving claims was costless and outcome-
neutral, applying Rule 23 affects neither the ex ante probability of the
plaintiffs' success nor the ex ante value of the recovery that they are
entitled to receive.
Without a doubt-and this was the entire reason the defendant
fought so hard to keep Rule 23 from being employed-using Rule 23
changed the value of the plaintiffs' claims in the real world, in which
procedure is neither costless nor outcome-neutral; the case went from
one worth nothing (because the costs of litigation exceeded the gross
expected recovery of $250), to one with a positive value. 150 The reasons
for this change in value were the reduction in per-plaintiff costs (that
is, economies of scale) and, possibly, the increase in the probability of
recovery that class aggregation created. 151 But, as the "procedure as
the agency of change" theory holds, changes in value inevitably occur
in the post-filing processing of a claim. With class actions, the extent
of the change can be dramatic (in Shady Grove, the claims went from
worthless to worthwhile); and a change of this extent might tempt
some to characterize such a rule as "substantive." But the size of the
change in value is irrelevant.
The relevant issue is whether the changes in value affected the
ex ante expected value of the plaintiffs' claims or their legal
entitlement in a world of costless and outcome-neutral procedure.
Rather, the admittedly dramatic changes in value that Rule 23 caused
in Shady Grove resulted from the costliness of procedure in the real
world. That type of change does not require a federal court to use a
state rule. Put differently, Rule 23 fits within part (a) of the principle
(it affects the probability of recovery (P) and the cost of bringing a case
(C), thus affecting the ex ante expected value). But Rule 23 does not fit
within part (b) of the principle, for the changes to probability and cost
that it caused in Shady Grove arose from the operation of a rule that
150. It seems evident that the class action yielded a positive value for the plaintiff; otherwise
the plaintiff would not have brought the claim. It is not as clear whether the case had a positive
value for all the members of the class, but other provisions of Rule 23, especially the typicality
and adequacy-of-representation requirements of Rules 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4) should, at a
minimum, ensure that the class members are in no worse position than they would have been
had they not been brought into the class. See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2009).
151. Class actions can change the probability of recovery in various ways. For instance, some
experimental data suggest that the aggregation of related claims can make a factfinder more
willing to assign a greater degree of responsibility to that defendant. See Horowitz & Bordens,
Aggregation, supra note 44, at 225-26. In addition, the greater amount of potential recovery
might well attract a better lawyer to the case. See Tidmarsh, supra note 150, at 1150.
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described the post-filing process for resolving the class members'
claims.
In short, the federal courts were not required to apply New
York's rule barring class actions, and the result in Shady Grove was
right-albeit not for the reasons given in the case. Justice Stevens
came closest to the mark when he tried to find a way to give the
second half of the Rules Enabling Act (§ 2072(b)) some meaning. As he
stated unconvincingly, class actions are no different from lower filing
fees or more generous deadlines for briefs; these rules might also
induce a party to file a case in, or remove a case to, federal court, and
while "[t]here is of course a difference of degree between those
examples and class certification, [there is] not a difference of kind."152
But Justice Stevens failed to articulate a good basis for distinguishing
rules different in degree from those different in kind. He assayed that
the distinguishing principle was that none of these rules was a
"damages proscription,"153 and he then went further afield by
suggesting that such differences in degree would matter if the case
were decided under the "twin aims" analysis rather than the Rules
Enabling Act analysis. 154
Justice Stevens was only partially correct. A "damages
proscription" helps to shape the ex ante value of a claim in a costless
and outcome-neutral procedural world; therefore, Justice Stevens was
correct to assert that a federal court in a diversity case must apply
such a state-law proscription. But limiting the distinction just to
damages proscriptions was inadequate. Inputs other than damages
proscriptions also affect a claim's ex ante expected value. Likewise,
Justice Stevens was right to assert that Rule 23 was different in
degree but not kind. The relevant difference in kind, however, is
whether a rule affects the probability, amount, or costliness of
recovery in the process of resolving the claim (as Rule 23 does) or
independently of the process of resolution (as a statute of limitations
does). Justice Stevens' argument also failed to recognize that the same
distinction applies regardless of whether the case was a Rules
Enabling Act case or a "twin aims" case.
Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion, missed the mark by a
somewhat wider margin; he overemphasized the circular "really
regulates procedure" definition, without attempting to find any room
for § 2072(b) to do the independent work it should do. And Justice
152. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 & n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
153. Id. at 1459 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id.
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Ginsburg had it completely wrong in her dissent, even though she had
the result completely right in Gasperini. The results in Gasperini and
Shady Grove are not inconsistent. It was simply a matter of finding
the right principle to reconcile the cases.
Indeed, one advantage of the principle I have posited is that it
makes the initial dispute between Justice Ginsburg's dissent and
Justice Scalia's majority opinion 155 disappear: characterizing the
dispute as either a Rules Enabling Act or a "procedural Erie"
dispute156 is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant when both halves of
the analysis apply the same principle and generate the same answer.
C. A Test Case
One of the questions left open by the result in Shady Grove was
whether New York, which wished to discourage the use of class
actions in cases involving statutory penalties, 15 7 has any means to
make federal courts respect its policy. Here is one possibility: enact a
statute that caps the damages available in a class action at some level
(whether a flat amount or a percentage of either the harm caused or
the defendant's assets).158 Such a statute would act in much the way
that the post-filing contingencies in Ragan and Walker did.159 In
Ragan and Walker, the post-filing contingency affected the probability
of recovery (P); here, such a statute would affect the amount of
recovery (L). In both situations, the statutes affect the ex ante
expected value of the claim even in a costless and outcome-neutral
procedural world.
In other words, although the hypothetical New York statute
uses a rule of process (the class action) as its post-filing trigger for the
damages-limiting contingency, the statute limiting damages is not
itself a rule "describing a part of the post-filing process" for resolving
the claim. It is a rule describing the value (or substance) of the claim
155. On this point Justice Stevens joined Justice Scalia's opinion, thus forging a majority.
156. See supra notes 11, 96-97 and accompanying text.
157. For discussions of New York's policy, see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440-41; id. at
1464-65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Such a statute would not be unprecedented. For instance, the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act provides that, when consumers bring individual suits for illegal debt-collection
practices, they can obtain their actual damages, as well as "such additional damages as the court
may allow, but not exceeding $1,000." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (2006). When consumers' claims
are brought as a class action, however, the Act allows named class representatives to obtain the
same relief as plaintiffs who filed individually, id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i), but limited the recovery of
class members to an amount "not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net
worth of the debt collector," id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i).
159. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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under different contingencies. Therefore, the damages-limiting rule
meets the conditions in both part (a) and part (b) of the principle (it
affects the ex ante expected value of recovery and does not describe
the process for valuing claims), and a federal court must apply it.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that, for Erie purposes,
a statute imposing a cap on damages awardable in a class action was
no different from the statute in Shady Grove itself, in which class
actions could not be used to recover an available penalty. 160 But there
is an evident difference between the two-the difference between a
rule that establishes the substantive value of a claim and a rule that
describes the process by which the substantive value is determined.
D. Justifying the Principle Normatively
Any principle that adequately describes a body of law in
apparent disarray contains its own justification. Aside from its
adequacy, however, the principle I have described has numerous
advantages over present doctrine. First, it avoids a difficult, and (as
Shady Grove shows) increasingly fractious, characterization
question.161 Second, in its application, the principle relies on intuitions
from the Hand Formula and the Coase Theorem;1 62 but, as the
application of the principle to Shady Grove shows, exact calculations
of the kind that often defeat economic analysis in real-world settings
are unnecessary. 63 Thus, the principle is easy to apply-far easier,
and with less room for disagreement, than the Hanna framework,
which the Court continues to struggle to apply.
Most substantially, the principle guarantees that federal courts
have the ability to apply their own rules to process claims, as long as
they are indeed rules of process. The interest of federal courts in using
their own procedural rules is patent; uniformity, simplicity, and
efficiency all argue for the use of a single set of familiar procedures.
1 64
160. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466-67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161. See supra notes 11, 96-97 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 17, 116, 118 and accompanying text.
163. See supra text following note 149; see also McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d
1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) ("[Tihe [Hand] formula has greater analytic than
operational significance. Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in monetizing personal
injuries may continue to frustrate efforts to measure expected accident costs with the precision
that is possible, in principle at least, in measuring the other side of the equation-the cost or
burden of precaution.").
164. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) ("Since the procedural rules of its
courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may
apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its courts."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971) (recognizing the forum's interest in the application of its own
procedural law).
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On the other hand, the federal courts' interest in applying their own
rules to influence the value of state-law claims before these claims
enter the litigation system is considerably less. 165 Thus, the principle
locates the source of rulemaking in the system that has the greater
interest in having its rule applied.
But these evident advantages are insufficient if the principle
undercuts Erie and its procedural progeny. Erie "expressed a policy
that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between
State and federal courts. '"166 Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the
Rules Enabling Act also reflect an allocation of power among branches
of the federal government, especially with regard to the propriety of
common-law rulemaking.167 The question is whether the principle that
I have posited adequately respects these concerns.
In fact, the principle respects these concerns at least as well as
the framework descended from Hanna. For the reasons that I have
described, the principle does an excellent job-better than the present
"really regulates procedure" analysis created in Sibbach and employed
by the plurality in Shady Grove-of respecting the text of the Rules
Enabling Act, while still honoring the strong presumption that the
rulemaking authority Congress delegated to the Supreme Court has
been properly exercised. To be clear, I do not contend that the
principle conforms perfectly to congressional intent. After all, the
principle draws inspiration from process philosophy, the Hand
Formula, and the Coase Theorem, the former of which was probably
not in Congress's contemplation when it passed the Rules Enabling
Act in 1934 and the latter two of which had not been postulated until
1947 and 1960, respectively. But the principle does recapture, albeit in
a rather technical formulation, the basic intuition about the difference
between "procedure" and "substantive rights."' 68 It conforms to the
results of the Rules Enabling Act cases. 169 And it does so in a way that
gives each provision of § 2072 meaning.
170
165. For the classic arguments against a federal interest in creating rules that affect the
value of a state-law claim, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co.
of N.Y v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
166. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
167. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 3 (2000) (explaining that Erie's "vital concern lay in broader ideas about judicial
lawmaking and separation of powers"); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act, supra note 47, at
1113-15 (explaining the fundamental importance of "directing attention to allocation of powers").
168. See supra note 139-41 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 127-28, 131-132 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("It is our duty to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Searight v.
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Moreover, the principle respects the concerns for federalism
that underlie Erie. As Justice Frankfurter said, "the intent of [Erie]
was to insure that, in [diversity cases], the outcome of the litigation in
the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court."171 As recast and softened by Chief Justice Warren, the aims of
Erie, at least in the procedural arena, were "discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.
'172
On first blush, it appears that the principle I have posited does not
result in "substantially the same" outcomes when a case is filed in
federal rather than state court. On the contrary, it frankly
acknowledges that procedure affects litigation outcomes, and does not
appear to eliminate incentives to forum shop or avoid differential
results.
But the principle is more respectful of states' interests than it
initially appears. To begin-and this is a point of some significance-it
does not change the result in a single case in which the Court held
that Erie required a federal court to use a state-court rule. 173 Second,
it is important to recall exactly what types of federal common-law
procedural rules survive the operation of the principle. Any federal
common-law rules that affect the ex ante expected value of a state-law
claim fail unless they describe the post-filing process for resolving the
claim. The completeness of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
describing a system of procedure means that federal courts have little
room to create procedural common law that passes through this
filter. 174
Most of the federal common-law rules that might pass through
this filter are likely to be of minor consequence to the litigation.
Perhaps, for instance, a federal court has its own rule requiring
motions to be filed on 8V2" x 11" paper, but the state court requires
motions to be filed on 8 /" x 14" paper. The federal rule describes part
of the process for resolving the claim; it does not affect the ex ante
expected value of a state-law claim in a costless and outcome-neutral
procedural world. Hence, under the principle, the federal court is free
Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 161 (1845) ("Every word of a statute must receive a meaning,
unless the court are compelled to consider some words synonymous.").
171. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
172. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
173. Specifically, the principle explains-and accepts as correct-Erie itself, as well as the
following "procedural Erie" cases in which the Court required federal courts to apply an arguably
procedural state-court rule: Cities Service, Palmer, Guaranty Trust, Ragan, Woods, Cohen,
Walker, and Gasperini. See supra notes 119-126, 142-144 and accompanying text.
174. See supra text preceding note 140.
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to apply its own rule rather than the state court's differing rule.175 But
there is no great affront to federalism in permitting the use of the
federal rule in this case. As Guaranty Trust said, a federal court can
use its own rules of procedure, rather than the differing state-court
rules, as long as the outcome in federal court is "substantially"-not
identically, but substantially-the same as it would have been in a
state court that adopted the state-court rule. 176 Justice Ginsburg
emphasized the same point in Shady Grove, arguing that there is no
need to adopt a state court's procedural rule unless the variation "is
indeed 'substantial.' "177 Thus, adopting the federal "file on 8 " x 11"
paper" rule would not run afoul of the twin aims of Erie; it is unlikely
to induce a significant amount of forum shopping, and deciding a case
by means of a "file on 8 " x 11" paper" rule rather than a "file on 8 "
x 14" paper" rule leads to no inequity.
I have, of course, focused on a "procedural" rule-the 8%" x 11"
filing requirement-and the objection could be made that other federal
common-law "procedural" rules would affect outcomes more
substantially. Undoubtedly that is true, but it is important to recall
that the Supreme Court has permitted federal courts to employ their
own rules in at least two such instances: permitting juries rather than
judges to determine certain facts in Byrd, and permitting trial judges
rather than appellate judges to make excessive-damages
determinations in Gasperini. The principle that I have espoused
explains these decisions and generalizes from them. The principle is
not arguing for a rebalancing of federalism; it is justifying the balance
the Court has already struck.
In striking a proper balance,178 it is important to recall that one
of the main points of diversity jurisdiction is to provide a forum free of
local bias.17 9 Because procedure affects outcomes, a state can advance
175. If such a rule is required by the local rules of a federal district court, the rule arguably
falls within the ambit of Rule 83(a), which allows federal district courts to promulgate local rules
"consistent with" federal statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, the rule also
arguably falls within the Rules Enabling Act analysis, rather than the federal procedural
common-law analysis. For sake of the argument, however, I am willing to assume that such a
rule cannot be justified under a Rules Enabling Act analysis.
176.326 U.S. at 109.
177. 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1471 (2010) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). The word "substantial" had
appeared in both Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Gasperini, see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 (1996), and in Hanna, see 380 U.S. at 467.
178. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 (noting the desirability of accommodating "the principal
state and federal interests").
179. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The reasonableness of the agency of
the national courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial,
speaks for itself."); see also Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)
(noting that "the constitution itself . . . views with such indulgence the possible fears and
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its parochial interests through procedural means every bit as much as
it can through substantive ones. When a federal court eschews a
process that is responsive to such parochial interests, it helps to attain
the even-handed justice for which diversity jurisdiction was intended.
Moreover, diversity jurisdiction helps to prevent capture of the state
courts by local interests and spurs innovation in legal rules by
creating competition.180 To the extent that the process federal courts
use to resolve disputes is better or more efficient, allowing federal
courts to use their own process for state-law claims can force the
states to consider improvements to their processes-which is an
advantage of any principle that gives federal courts the freedom to
apply their own rules of procedure.
18
In carving out this freedom, the principle I have described cuts
a clear line. Rules that affect the gross pre-litigation value of a claim
are for the states to determine. Rules that affect only the processing of
this claim are for the court that processes the claim to determine-
even though the use of these rules affects the claim's value. 8 2
apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of
controversies.., between citizens of different states").
180. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
181. Cf. Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007) (arguing that the existence of multiple common-law courts in
England fostered competition for legal business, resulting in numerous innovations in the
common law). Indeed, after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many state
courts adopted the Federal Rules nearly in toto, and the basic vision of the Federal Rules-
liberal pleading, broad discovery, generous joinder, and so on-has exercised an influence even
on those states that did not adopt the Rules. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal
Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1367, 1367 (1986) (analyzing states that adopted the Federal Rules or its philosophy regarding
pleading, as well as states that did not). But see John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal
Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 383-84 (2003) (describing more divergence between
federal and state practices in recent years).
182. In some sense, this result is a mirror image of another aspect of federalism: the
independent-and-adequate-state-ground rule, in which the issue is whether a state procedural
rule can act as a barrier to the Supreme Court's review of federal substantive claims that the
state court declined to decide for a procedural reason. In that context, the Court balances the
interest of the state court in applying its own procedural rules against the federal interest in
resolving the federal substantive question at stake. Although the doctrine has fluctuated over
the years, the Court has generally recognized the importance of state courts applying their own
procedural rules to determine claims, and does not generally ignore those procedural rules even
if the consequence is frustration of the Court's ability to review the substantive federal question.
See Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 618 (2009) (holding that "a discretionary state procedural
rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review"); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 496-518 (6th ed.
2009) (discussing the independent-and-adequate-state-ground doctrine in the procedural
context). Although the analogy is not perfect, the converse proposition here is that federal courts
have an interest in applying, and therefore should be allowed to apply, their own process to
adjudicate claims based on state law.
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At the same time, some modesty about this principle is
necessary. I do not argue that the principle is normatively better than
any of a number of other principles that could determine the role of
state-court rules in federal-court adjudication. Depending on the
vision of federalism that a government wishes to advance, better
approaches might be either to have federal courts adopt each and
every rule a state court would adopt (a strong federalism) or adopt
none of the rules that a state court would adopt (a weak federalism).
Moreover, as I have said, there is an important distinction between
substantive doctrine and substantive outcomes.18 3 Granting that Erie
is correct, so that our vision of federalism requires federal courts to
adopt state substantive doctrine in diversity cases, we must still
decide whether and to what extent federal courts must arrive at the
same substantive outcome as their state counterparts. There is no
necessarily correct answer to this question.
What this principle does is to assume that the Court's decisions
answering this question are correct-that collectively the cases reflect
the type of federalism that we wish our government to achieve.
Accepting that vision, it is possible to state a single principle to
explain Erie and its seemingly disparate progeny. It is also possible to
provide a coherent argument why this principle is a good one. But it is
impossible to stretch the principle or the justification further.
CONCLUSION
To return to the beginning, adjudication is a process-a process
that evaluates the strength of legal entitlements and values the claims
that assert them. In the course of the process, the strength of the
entitlement and the value of the claim ebb and flow, until they reach
their final values at the case's end. This process, however, is distinct
from the outcomes that the process produces (that is, the substantive
law and the specific values of claims asserted under this law). The
notion that procedure is substantive, or substance procedural, is
wrong. So is the notion that the meanings of procedure and substance
change with the context.l&4 That idea is perhaps our principal error,
and on that error we constructed a framework that treated issues
under the Rules Enabling Act and issues under the Rules of Decision
Act as distinct matters.
In fact, the line between process and substance is not difficult
to discern. Nor is the line between those cases in which the Court has
183. See supra text following note 81.
184. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
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required federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state-court rules
and those cases in which federal courts can apply their own rules. A
single principle-apply state-court rules only when they affect the ex
ante expected value of a claim in a costless and outcome-neutral
procedural world-provides the answer in the Erie context.
In multiple contexts, of which the Erie situation is only one, an
important question is whether a forum court should apply only the
substantive law of the jurisdiction that is the source of the claim, or
whether the forum court must achieve, to the extent that rules can do
so, the same outcome as a court in the jurisdiction that supplies the
substantive law.185 It is not necessarily true that the principle used in
the Erie context should apply in other contexts. In searching for the
correct principle in each context, however, we cannot hide behind the
bromide that the meanings of procedure and substance vary with the
context. They don't.
185. For instance, in the horizontal choice-of-law context, a forum court sometimes applies
the substantive law of another state; but a separate issue is whether the forum court must also
apply the procedural law of the state that supplies the substantive law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122-44 (1971) (listing situations in which a state court should
and should not apply its own rules to process a claim). Likewise, in the reverse-Erie context, a
state forum court might need to apply federal substantive law; but a separate issue is whether
the forum court must apply the procedural law that a federal court would apply. See Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (stating that "the right to trial by
jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the [Federal Employers' Liability Act] to
permit it to be classified as a mere local rule of procedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio
has here used").
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